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Emotional experiences are pervasive in everyday life and can influence our 
thoughts and actions. Dysregulation of cue triggered emotions and emotional 
mood states are core features of several mental illnesses, such as anxiety and 
mood disorders, that peak in prevalence during adolescence— a time of 
heightened sensitivity to social and emotional cues in the environment. During 
this period of development, emergence of exploratory and criminal behaviors 
is reflected in the “age-crime curve” whereby these behaviors emerge during 
the teen years and subsequently decline by the mid-twenties. Often when 
young people come in contact with the law, it is under emotionally charged 
situations, further highlighting the importance of understanding the impact of 
emotions on brain and behavior across development. We developed a novel 
behavioral paradigm for use with functional MRI to examine the impact of 
emotions on cognitive control and the neural circuitry.  We incorporated brief 
and sustained positive and negative emotional states to distinguish effects of 
arousal versus valence.  
 
We first tested for dissociable effects of both positive and negative emotional 
cues and states on cognitive performance and neural processes. We find that 
in adults, brief emotional triggers or cues, whether positive or negative, 
similarly influence cognitive control. In contrast, sustained emotional states 
 
 
differentially impact cognitive control. Specifically, positive states enhance 
performance while negative state diminishes performance. Behavioral 
differences were paralleled by differential recruitment of fronto-parietal and 
fronto-striatal circuitry.  
 
Central to our primary question, we next examined the impact of these 
emotions on behavior and brain during the transition from adolescence to 
adulthood, in teens 13 to 17, young adults 18 to 21, and over 21 years-old. We 
show protracted development of cognitive control in both brief and prolonged 
potentially threatening situations into the early twenties. This behavioral 
pattern was paralleled by developmental changes in prefrontal circuitry. The 
question remains as to how reactivity to emotional information during 
adolescence may impacts subsequent memory for this information. We show 
preliminary evidence that temporal dynamics of memory processes may be 
changing across development. Together these studies begin to dissociate 
complex influences of emotions on behavioral and neural processes across 
development and how they may differentially lead to changes in behavior and 
actions. 
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Chapter 1:  
Adolescence: When social and affective inputs overshadow cognitive 
processes— An Introduction* 
 
Adolescence is a typical developmental transition between childhood and 
adulthood, when the individual must learn to function relatively independent of 
the parent or caregiver. This developmental period is a time when the brain 
may be more “plastic” than it will ever be again, capable of remarkable 
adaptability in light of the many social, physical, sexual, and intellectual 
challenges encountered during this developmental phase (Casey et al., 2015). 
With these novel and multifaceted challenges comes the need for cognitive 
control –  the ability to suppress irrelevant emotions, desires and actions in 
favor of adaptive or goal-oriented ones (Casey, 2015). During adolescence, 
the ability to exercise cognitive control is influenced by a heightened sensitivity 
to rewards (Galvan et al., 2006; Geier et al., 2010; Van Leijenhorst et al., 
2010), potential threats (Cohen-Gilbert & Thomas, 2013; Dreyfuss et al., 2014; 
Grose-Fifer et al., 2013; Hare et al., 2008) and social inputs (Chein et al., 
2010; Steinberg et al., 2009) in the environment. Gaps in knowledge remain 
as to when—during the course of development— and how—at both the 
behavioral and neurobiological levels— these social and emotional factors 
impact cognitive control processes. The present thesis aims to address these 
gaps in the extant literature in three experiments that investigate changes in 
 
 
 
* The text and figures of this chapter has been taken in large part from a recently published 
book chapter (Cohen, A.O. and Casey, B.J. (2017). The Neurobiology of Adolescent Self 
Control. In T. Egner (Ed.) The Wiley Handbook of Cognitive Control). Edits were made for the 
purposes of tailoring the content to the current thesis, to include more recently published 
results, and to avoid repetition with content presented in subsequent chapters. 
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behavioral and neural correlates of cognitive control processes in both 
emotionally charged and relatively neutral situations. The overarching goal of 
this thesis is to better understand when and how cognitive control may be 
influenced by emotional inputs during the transition from adolescence to 
adulthood. 
 
Development of Cognitive Control 
 
Cognitive control is a theoretical construct at the heart of numerous theories of 
attention and memory (Baddeley, 1986; Cohen et al., 1992; Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995; Shallice, 1988) that has many different components (e.g., 
inhibitory control, performance monitoring, working memory) (Badre, 2011; 
Luna et al., 2015) and labels (e.g., "central executive," "attentional bias," 
“supervisory system”). These terms all suggest a mechanism that is required 
to inhibit reflexive actions (Shallice, 1988) and to redirect attention (Desimone 
& Duncan, 1995) and actions (Miller & Cohen, 2001) in favor of adaptive ones. 
Thus, cognitive control refers to a capacity to suppress irrelevant thoughts and 
actions, in favor of adaptive or goal-oriented ones (Allport, 1987; Casey et al. 
2000, 2002; Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992; Kahneman et al., 1983). 
Typically, when this ability involves the suppression of inappropriate emotions 
and desires, it is referred to as self control (Casey, 2015). The neural circuitry 
underlying control differs by the type of information and stage of processing 
being regulated or suppressed (Casey et al., 2000; 2005; Jonides & Nee, 
2006). In other words, different circuitry may come into play when we suppress 
unwanted information by focusing attention on something else; suppress 
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unwanted thoughts by thinking about something else; or suppress an action, 
impulse or desire by engaging in an alternative action or withholding an action 
(Mischel et al., 2011; Casey et al., 2011).    
 
Neuroimaging studies of cognitive control are consistent with this idea in that 
these studies show non-overlapping patterns of brain activity for a number of 
tasks including the Flanker, Go-Nogo, and Stroop tasks (Nee, Wager, & 
Jonides, 2007). These tasks and others that recruit cognitive control 
processes reveal modest, if any, correlations with one another in behavioral 
performance as well (Earles et al., 1997; Grant & Dagenbach, 2000; Kramer et 
al., 1994; Shilling et al., 2002; Tipper & Baylis, 1987). Together, these 
behavioral and neuroimaging findings suggest that control processes involved 
in resolving interference are likely due to multiple rather than a single 
mechanism, brain region or circuit. Nonetheless, lateral frontoparietal circuitry 
has been implicated reliably in imaging studies of cognitive control across a 
number of tasks (Vincent et al., 2008; Power et al., 2011).    
 
Developmental studies of cognitive control processes such as suppressing 
unwanted information in memory in favor of relevant information (i.e., working 
memory) or suppressing an action in favor of an alternative one (i.e., response 
inhibition) show steady improvement during childhood that typically plateaus 
by adolescence (Casey, 2013; Davidson et al., 2006; Luna et al., 2010; Paus, 
2005). The improvement in performance with age is paralleled by changes in 
patterns of activity in frontoparietal and frontostriatal circuitry across 
development (Adleman et al., 2002; Bunge et al., 2000; Casey et al., 1995, 
1997; Crone et al., 2006; Darki & Klingberg, 2014; Durston et al., 2002, 2006; 
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Luna et al., 2001; Rubia et al., 2000; Tam et al., 2002; Thomas et al., 1999; 
Kwon et al., 2002; Rubia et al., 2006) and in white matter tracts within and 
across these circuits (Giedd et al., 2008; Liston et al 2006; Paus, 2005; 
Stevens et al., 2009), consistent with the basic circuitry implicated in adult 
neuroimaging studies of cognitive control.  However, the development of 
cognitive control processes occurs in the context of significant reorganization 
of brain circuitry, especially during adolescence as structural and functional 
connections become more hardwired with maturation and experience (Casey, 
2015; Casey et al., 2015).   
 
Reorganization of the Brain during Adolescence  
 
Cognitive, emotional and behavioral changes during adolescence are 
paralleled by hormonal and neurobiological changes that are regional in 
nature (Casey et al., 2015). Nonhuman primate and human postmortem 
studies show that this period is associated with regional elimination and 
stabilization of synapses that are predominantly excitatory (Huttenlocher & 
Dabholkar, 1997; Rakic et al., 1994). Sensorimotor regions undergo pruning 
before higher order association cortices. These regional changes in synaptic 
connections are paralleled by regional changes in patterns of cell firing and in 
the availability neurotrophins, neurochemicals, gonadal hormones and their 
receptors (Lee et al., 2014). For example, mesocorticolimbic dopamine and 
the endogenous cannabinoid system modulate regional changes in excitatory 
and inhibitory balance within cortical-subcortical circuitry (Doremus-Fitzwater 
& Spear, 2016; Floresco & Tse, 2007). Peaks in dopamine receptor 
expression within the accumbens (Brenhouse et al., 2008) occur before peak 
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dopamine signaling within the prefrontal cortex (Tseng & O’Donnell, 2007). 
Cannabinoid receptor and ligand levels are reported to be higher in the 
striatum and prefrontal cortex of adolescent relative to adult animals and 
activation of these receptors has been shown to modulate dopamine activity 
(Doremus-Fitzwater & Spear, 2016; Fitzgerald et al., 2012). 
 
Human imaging studies reveal a similar pattern of regional changes in brain 
development with structural changes in phylogentically older sensorimotor 
cortex and subcortical limbic regions developing before association cortices, 
such as regions of the prefrontal cortex that do not reach maturity until the 
early twenties (Chugani et al., 1987; Gogtay et al., 2004; Mills et al., 2014; 
2016; Sowell et al., 1999). Increases in white matter are concurrent with 
decreases in gray matter (Giedd et al., 1999; Giorgio et al., 2008; Simmonds 
et al., 2014), with association cortices showing the most pronounced changes 
in both myelination and cortical thinning throughout adolescence (Whitaker et 
al., 2016). Consistent with these neuroimaging findings, postmortem studies 
indicate that myelination in the human neocortex is protracted relative to 
nonhuman primates, continuing beyond adolescence, through the late 
twenties (Miller et al., 2012). The ubiquitous regional progressive and 
regressive changes in gray and white matter volumes and brain activity 
throughout the brain are thought to reflect refinement of functional circuits 
(Brown et al., 2005; 2006; Durston et al 2006).  
 
Fundamental changes in patterns of functional connectivity throughout the 
brain have been shown across development using resting state functional MRI 
(rsfMRI). Early studies of rsfMRI revealed that over the course of 
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development, short-range, local functional connectivity decreases while long-
range connections among brain regions increase (Fair et al., 2007; 2008; 
2009). These findings suggest that there is a developmental shift towards 
integration of various brain networks into distributed functional networks with 
connectivity rapidly increasing with the onset of adolescence and plateauing 
by the mid-twenties (Dosenbach et al., 2010). Although more recent studies 
suggest that these results may be attributable in part to motion artifacts 
(Power et al., 2012), subsequent studies employing rigorous control for motion 
show smaller effects but similar results (Baker et al., 2015; Satterthwaite et al. 
2012; 2013). Different functional networks also show differing developmental 
trajectories (Stevens, 2016) as indexed by changes in the balance of graph 
theoretical measures of within-network and between-network connectivity 
across development (Gu et al., 2015). Emerging research suggests that 
interactions between networks contribute to individual variability in cognitive 
control during adolescence (Dwyer et al., 2014). Together, these studies 
reveal that multiple functional networks, including frontoparietal and cingulo-
opercular networks implicated in cognitive control processes (Power et al., 
2011), all undergo reorganization from childhood to adulthood and may each 
provide unique contributions to the larger scale brain network architecture at 
different points in development (Gu et al., 2015; Stevens, 2016). 
 
In the context of adolescent brain development, significant structural and 
functional changes occur in several limbic subcortical regions before higher 
order association cortices, including the prefrontal cortex (Galvan et al., 2006; 
Mills et al., 2014). These regional structural and functional changes have been 
hypothesized to lead to transient imbalances in functional brain circuitry that 
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can lead to dysregulation of emotions and actions during adolescence (Casey 
et al., 2008; Casey, 2015). Figure 1.1 highlights the development of a 
simplified neurocircuitry implicated in cognitive and affective control, from 
childhood to adulthood. Early work in rodents initiated the mapping of 
connectivity as well as unique and complimentary functions of each of these 
brain regions (Krettek & Price, 1977; Groenewegen & Berendse, 1990; Wright 
& Groenewegen, 1995).  
 
Figure 1.1: Schematic of cognitive and motivational circuitry development. 
The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) has reciprocal connections 
with both the amygdala (Amy) and ventral striatum (VS). The ventral 
striatum also receives direct projections from the basolateral amygdala. 
Subcortical connections from the amygdala to the ventral striatum are 
proposed to show changes before cortico-subcortical projections from 
prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, cortico-cortico connections from lateral 
prefrontal cortex (lPFC) to vmPFC implicated in cognitive control mature. 
Dotted lines represent immature projections. 
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Cross species research has implicated the prefrontal cortex broadly in 
behavioral regulation and the PFC can be roughly grouped into medial and 
lateral subdivisions. The medial PFC has reciprocal connections with both the 
amygdala and the ventral striatum and the lateral PFC projects directly to the 
amygdala and indirectly to the ventral striatum, with returning projections 
primarily going through medial PFC (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Tanji & Hoshi, 
2008). The striatum, implicated in computations related to prediction of 
outcomes (Haber & Knutson, 2010), and the amygdala, a region involved in 
associative learning (Janak & Tye, 2015), are directly connected via ascending 
projections from the basolateral amygdala to the nucleus accumbens (Stuber 
et al., 2011). Considering these regions as interacting networks rather than 
unitary regions with orthogonal functions may drive developmental cognitive 
neuroscience research more toward a mechanistic understanding of why 
adolescents engage in the behaviors they do (Casey et al., 2015). Recent 
developmental neuroimaging studies have worked toward understanding the 
organization and function of these circuits by examining cognitive control in the 
context of motivational and socioemotional contexts (i.e. self control). 
 
Motivational and Socioemotional Influences on Cognitive Control 
Development 
 
The palette on which cognitive and neural development take place becomes 
more colorful and complex when we consider how emotional or motivational 
processes modulate or impact cognitive control processes, especially during 
adolescence. Socioemotional information is often present in contexts where 
individuals must exercise cognitive control (e.g. in the presence of rewards, 
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peers, or potential threats). Researchers have begun to provide a clearer 
picture of how recruitment of cognitive control changes across development by 
employing variations of simple behavioral paradigms, often in conjunction with 
neuroimaging, that incorporate these social and emotional elements.  
 
Impact of Incentives.  The influence of incentives on self control undergoes 
pronounced change from childhood to adulthood. Early work on how reward is 
functionally represented in the developing brain revealed that key components 
of reward circuitry—the ventral striatum and the orbitofrontal cortex— were 
sensitive to the magnitude of rewards (large vs small) across age groups 
(Galván et al. 2006). Adolescents show an exaggerated accumbens response 
to large rewards, relative to both children and adults, whereas the extent of 
orbitofrontal cortex activity exhibited more of a monotonic or linear pattern of 
change across development. Subsequent studies have shown differential 
accumbens activity in adolescents relative to adults in reward-related tasks 
(Bjork et al., 2008; 2010; Cohen et al., 2010; Geier et al., 2010; van den Bos 
et al., 2009). These findings and others have raised questions as to how 
incentives may exert influence over cognitive control during adolescence. For 
instance, an increased sensitivity to incentives could both diminish and 
enhance cognitive control in at least two ways. Motivational cues such as 
pictures of food, a smiling face or an accepting peer may capture attention 
and/or lead to impulsive actions toward that cue. In contrast, given the 
potential heightened sensitivity of rewards to adolescents, they may work 
harder and/or engage cognitive control more when receipt of reward is 
dependent on their actions (Geier et el 2010; Hardin et al., 2009; Teslovich et 
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al., 2014). We highlight work examining each of these potential outcomes of 
incentive sensitivity below. 
 
A number of behavioral studies show marked performance differences across 
development when reward cues or incentives are used. Across these tasks, 
adolescents, as compared to adults, show increased risk taking when making 
decisions following immediate or positive reward outcomes as opposed to 
delayed ones (Figner et al., 2009; Cauffman et al., 2010). This increase in 
risky behavior appears to peak in mid to late adolescence. Delay discounting 
of reward values also varies with age, with younger adolescents showing a 
preference for smaller rewards sooner over larger rewards later, indicating 
diminished future orientation (Steinberg et al., 2009). Recent work shows that 
adolescents also demonstrate heightened tolerance to ambiguity and 
uncertainty, relative to children and adults, when making a risky decision (van 
den Bos & Hertwig, 2017). These studies suggest that both sensitivity to 
rewards and decreased weighting of potential outcomes peak during 
adolescence and that the salience of rewards may lead to breakdowns in 
performance on cognitive control tasks. An imaging study of a monetary 
gambling task revealed that increasing expected value of gambles more 
strongly influences gambling choices in adolescents than in adults (Barkley-
Levenson & Galván, 2014). This behavioral effect was paralleled by increased 
ventral striatum activity in adolescents relative to adults, which remained 
pronounced even when the age groups were matched for performance, 
indicating that the neural developmental effect was likely due to a 
developmental difference in recruitment of reward circuitry. 
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In contrast to observations of appetitive cues diminishing cognitive control, 
heightened sensitivity to rewards during adolescence has also been shown to 
improve performance on cognitive control tasks. This phenomenon seems to 
be specific to circumstances when the rewards are contingent upon how well 
individuals perform. Variations of impulse control tasks like the antisaccade 
task, on which a participant must look in the opposite direction of a cue, have 
been used to test this. Adolescents showed enhanced performance relative to 
adults when instructed that the amount of money they could win was 
contingent on their performance on the task (Geier et al., 2010; Hardin et al., 
2009). This improved performance was paralleled by increased ventral striatal 
activity in adolescents relative to adults when preparing to make a response in 
anticipation of a reward (Geier et al., 2010). Adolescents also showed 
increased activity in frontal eye field regions when preparing to make an eye 
movement, suggesting that rewards modulated or upregulated this control 
circuitry more in this age group than in adults.   
 
Reward based perceptual discrimination tasks show similar results. When 
small and large rewards are paired with correct detection of the direction of 
moving dots, adolescents appear to be less impulsive as indexed by slower 
reaction times than adults for trials associated with the largest rewards. These 
slower reaction times may reflect that, when a large incentive is at stake, 
adolescents let evidence accumulate until they are confident in their choice 
before making a decision in order to maximize their gains. These behavioral 
findings are paralleled by ventral striatal activity on large reward trials across 
ages but enhanced recruitment of fronto-parietal control regions by 
adolescents relative to adults (Teslovich et al., 2014). Together these findings 
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suggest that adolescents’ sensitivity to rewards is associated with changes in 
activation of striatal reward circuitry that influences the recruitment of cognitive 
control circuitry differentially from adults.  
 
Influence of social cues and peers.  During adolescence there is a heightened 
orientation and sensitivity to peer influences relative to either childhood or 
adulthood (Steinberg & Monahan, 2007; Guyer et al., 2012; Somerville et al., 
2013). Social cues such as a simple smiling face can lead to impulsive 
behavior as measured on a go/nogo task in teens (Somerville et al., 2011). 
Specifically, when participants were told not to respond to rare smiling faces, 
only to neutral ones, adolescents were less able to withhold responses to the 
positive social cues as compared to both children and adults (Somerville et al., 
2011). This impulsive, adolescent-specific behavior, was paralleled by 
increased ventral striatal activity in adolescents relative to children and adults 
(Figure 1.2). A functional connectivity analysis showed increased cortico-
striatal coupling in adults, suggesting that immaturity of connections between 
Figure 1.2: Sensitivity to positive social cues. Adolescents make more 
errors to rare happy face cues (A) relative to both children and young 
adults. This behavior is paralleled by increased ventral striatum (B) 
activity (C). From Casey, 2015; Adapted Somerville et al., 2011  
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control fronto-striatal circuitry and reward circuitry may underlie diminished 
cognitive control in response to positive social cues during adolescence.  
 
Like positive social cues, the mere perceived presence of a peer can have a 
striking effect on cognitive control capabilities. Performance on decision-
making tasks, such as deciding whether to drive through a yellow light at an 
intersection or not, show adolescent specific deterioration in performance 
when a peer is present versus when performing the task alone (Chein et al., 
2011; Gardner &Steinberg, 2005; Weigard et al., 2014). This pattern of 
performance is paralleled by increased activation of brain areas implicated in 
reward circuitry, including the ventral striatum by adolescents, when choosing 
to go through the yellow light. The influence of peers on adolescent behavior is 
not specific to humans. Heightened sensitivity to peers is also observed in 
rodents. For example, “adolescent” mice consume more alcohol in the 
presence of another juvenile mouse than when alone, whereas adult mice 
show no difference in alcohol consumption with or without another mouse 
present (Logue et al., 2014). “Adolescent” rats show synergistic effects of 
drugs (nicotine and cocaine) and social stimuli such that interactions with other 
rats—even with limited physical contact (Peartree et al., 2012)—enhance 
conditioned place preference (Thiel et al., 2008; 2009). These findings suggest 
that the increase in risky behaviors when in the presence of peers during 
adolescence may be an evolutionarily conserved process across species. 
 
Understanding how adolescents interpret and learn from social signals can 
provide insight into the observed shift in social sensitivity during this period. 
Jones and colleagues (2014) recently examined the effects of positive social 
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feedback on brain and behavior across development. Modeling trial-by-trial 
learning, children and adults showed higher positive learning rates than 
adolescents when receiving variable reinforcement from peers, suggesting 
that adolescents show less differentiation in their actions toward peers who 
provided more or less positive feedback. Forming expectations about receiving 
positive social reinforcement correlated with neural activity within the medial 
prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum across age. Adolescents, unlike children 
and adults, showed greater insular activity during positive prediction error 
learning and increased activity in the supplementary motor cortex and the 
putamen when receiving positive social feedback regardless of the expected 
outcome. These results suggest that peer approval may motivate adolescents 
toward action. While different amounts of positive social reinforcement 
enhanced learning in children and adults, all positive social reinforcement 
equally motivated adolescents. Together, these findings indicate that 
sensitivity to social stimuli during adolescence goes beyond simple 
reinforcement theory accounts and suggests possible explanations for how 
peers may motivate action in adolescents. 
 
Influence of potential threat.  Not all experiences during adolescence are 
positive. As the adolescent begins to negotiate the world on their own, without 
the protection of a caregiver, potential threats may arise. Cues that signal a 
potential threat or danger are believed to increase arousal and attention to 
prepare the organism for action (fight or flight). Life experiences with fearful 
facial expressions lead to the interpretation of these cues as signals of 
potential imminent danger in the environment (Ohman & Mineka, 2001). Such 
stimuli can lead to behavioral inhibition as measured by slower responses 
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times on cognitive tasks (Hare et al., 2005; Macleod, 1991; Simpson et al., 
2000) and changes in psychophysiological responses, such as increased skin 
conductance and fluctuations in heart rate (Bradley et al., 2001; Ohman & 
Soares, 1998), consistent with the physiology of heightened arousal and 
increases in amygdala activity (Hare et al., 2005; Hariri et al., 2002; Scherf et 
al., 2013; Whalen et al., 2001).  
 
Recent developmental studies suggest that the characteristic behavioral and 
neural responses to negative emotional stimuli shown in adults are altered 
during adolescence, a time when these socially relevant stimuli are particularly 
salient (Cohen-Gilbert & Thomas, 2013; Grose-Fifer et al., 2013; Monk et al., 
2003). Adolescents, unlike children and adults, show more impulsive 
responses as measured by a Go/NoGo task when nontargets (letters) are 
superimposed on task-irrelevant negative scenes (Cohen-Gilbert & Thomas, 
2013). They also show greater attentional capture by fearful faces when used 
as task-irrelevant flankers (i.e., greater interference effects, Grose-Fifer et al., 
2013). These behavioral studies indicate that adolescents have difficulty 
suppressing attention and action towards cues of potential threat, even when 
the emotional cues are irrelevant to the task. Imaging studies parallel these 
findings, showing enhanced activity to fear faces in adolescents relative to 
adults (Baird et al 1999; Monk et al., 2003; Guyer et al., 2009) and children 
(Hare et al., 2008, see Figure 1.3). Activity in this region is positively correlated 
with reaction time, such that the greater the amygdala activity the slower 
reaction times in detection of these cues. Recently we examined the effect of 
threat cues on cognitive control. Adolescents were found to impulsively react 
to (i.e., approach rather than withdraw from) potential threat cues in a 
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Go/NoGo task more than children or adults (Dreyfuss et al., 2014). This 
adolescent specific peak in impulsivity to threat cues was paralleled by 
increased activity in medial prefrontal regions implicated in emotion regulation 
when successfully suppressing the impulse to respond to rare fearful faces 
cues, whereas greater lateral prefrontal activity, implicated in cognitive control, 
was associated with better behavioral performance across age. These results 
together with evidence of increased amygdala reactivity to emotional cues in 
adolescents (Hare et al., 2008; Guyer et al., 2009) suggest greater exertion of 
top-down regulation of subcortical structures may be necessary for effective 
recruitment of cognitive control circuitry in the presence of cues of potential 
danger.  
Taken together, these studies of cognitive control suggest that adolescent 
reactivity to emotional cues and less mature cortico-subcortical circuitry may 
lead to less efficient modulation by lateral prefrontal control circuitry, resulting 
in diminished cognitive control capacity in emotional situations (Heller et al., 
2016). These observations in humans are largely consistent with burgeoning 
work in “adolescent” animals that considers both the appetitive and aversive 
Figure 1.3: Sensitivity to cues of potential threat. Adolescents show greater 
false alarms (A) and amygdala (B) reactivity (C), relative to both children 
and adults, in response to fearful faces relative to neutral ones. 
Adapted from Dreyfuss et al., 2014; Hare et al., 2008 
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properties inherent in most stimuli and how changes in neurobiology during 
adolescence may influence behaviors in response to stimuli in the 
environment.  An adolescent phenotype of reward-centricity and attenuated 
responses to aversive properties of stimuli (Domerus-Fitzwater & Spear, 2016) 
has been proposed based on this work in rodents. Both the heightened 
sensitivity to rewarding and diminished sensitivity to aversive properties of 
stimuli may be evolutionarily conserved characteristics of adolescents that 
ultimately serve to motivate them towards action when faced with emotional 
situations. Although much of this research has thus far been behavioral, due in 
part to challenges in tailoring experiments for the short window of adolescence 
in rodents, recent work suggests that functional imbalances between cortical 
and subcortical circuitry are causally linked to deficits in inhibitory control 
(Meyer & Bucci, 2016). Future studies across development in both animals 
and humans will help to further elucidate the neural circuitry underlying the 
unique context-dependent patterns of behavior observed during adolescence. 
 
Neurobiological Models of Adolescence 
 
At least three prominent neurobiological models of adolescence have emerged 
over the past decade to explain the pronounced changes in cognitive control 
during this developmental period (Steinberg, 2005; Ernst et al 2006; Casey et 
al., 2008; Blakemore & Robbins, 2012, Figure 1.4 adapted from Casey, 2015). 
Of these, the dual system model has received the most attention, serving as a 
simple heuristic for linking brain and behavior. According to this model, there 
are orthogonal limbic “hot” and prefrontal “cold” systems that are in 
competition with one another (Metcalf & Mischel, 1999; McClure et al., 2004). 
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One analogy for characterizing these two systems builds on the 1960s 
television series Star Trek and its two main characters: James T. Kirk, the 
passionate captain of the Starship Enterprise from planet Earth who 
sometimes runs with his emotions and his first officer, Mr. Spock, a logical and 
rational native of the planet Vulcan. According to this analogy the cool 
prefrontal system is rational like Mr. Spock, while the hot limbic system is like 
the passionate Captain Kirk who has a tendency to ignore Starfleet 
regulations. This model provides a simple heuristic for how brain systems may 
compete, focusing largely on reward-based processes. Accordingly, the value-
based dominance of the limbic system during adolescence is thought to result 
in diminished cognitive control and increased risky decision-making. With 
development of prefrontal cortex, the brain becomes more “vulcanized” which 
helps with the delay of gratification and more logical decisions (McClure et al., 
2004; Cohen, 2005). Steinberg and colleagues suggest that during 
adolescence the cold system of the prefrontal cortex is less mature than the 
hot system and so the latter wins out when making decisions in motivated 
situations (among peers or rewards, Steinberg et al., 2008).  
  
Figure 1.4: Neurobiological Models of Adolescence. Abbreviations: Amy, 
amygdala; PFC, prefrontal cortex; VS, ventral striatum. 
Adapted from Casey, 2015 
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A second model proposed by Ernst and colleagues (2006; 2008) is the “triadic“ 
model. This model further subdivides the hot system from a reward system 
into both positively and negatively valenced subsystems that localize reward 
and threat to the ventral striatum and amygdala, respectively. The prefrontal 
cortex, serves as the modulator of these systems. Motivated behavior is 
proposed to stem from changes in gonadal hormonal and social reorientation 
that weight the reward system more heavily than threat during adolescence 
(Ernst et al., 2006; Ernst et al., 2008). This heavier weighting toward rewards 
over threats is thought to lead to thrill seeking and suboptimal choices during 
adolescence (Spielberg et al. 2014; Helfinstein & Casey, 2014). On the 
surface, thinking of adolescence as one big roller coaster ride of thrills seems 
tenable (Spielberger et al., 2014). However, converging animal (Paton et al., 
2006), imaging (Delgado et al., 2008; Levita et al., 2009), and computational 
(Li et al., 2011) studies show that brain regions are not organized by valence. 
Amygdala activity has been observed to threat, but also in anticipation and 
receipt of rewards (Hommer et al., 2003), during presentation of happy faces 
(Somerville et al., 2004) and pleasant tones (Levita et al 2009). Likewise, the 
ventral striatum has been associated with reward processing (anticipation and 
receipt), but activity in this area has also been observed in response to social 
(Britton et al., 2006), novel (Rebec et al., 1997) and aversive stimuli (Levita et 
al., 2009). Both of these regions, the amygdala and ventral striatum, influence 
action in response to positive and negative outcomes (Schultz et al., 1997; 
O’Doherty et al., 2003; Roesch et al., 2010). This mounting evidence suggests 
that while it is important to understand neural responses to negatively and 
positively valenced cues, how we learn to respond to this information in the 
form of our actions (approach or avoid) may help to explain the diminished 
20 
 
capacity for cognitive control in their presence (Guitart-Masip et al., 2014; 
Huys et al., 2011).  
 
A third model of adolescence is the imbalance model (Casey et al., 2008). 
This circuit-based model highlights action over value and valence in 
understanding adolescent behavior (Casey, 2015). We first proposed this 
model when finding regional functional brain changes within reward circuitry 
across development (Galvan et al., 2005; 2006). A nuance of this work was 
that adolescents not only showed differences from adults but also showed 
distinct behavior and brain activity from children (i.e., adolescent specific 
changes, Casey, 2013 for overview). The findings underscored that delayed 
prefrontal cortical maturation could not fully account for adolescent specific 
changes in behavior, because children have even less mature prefrontal 
circuitry. Instead, changes in behavior were posited to result from earlier 
functional changes in subcortical regions due to regional changes in synaptic 
pruning, peaks in available neurochemicals and increased local connectivity 
relative to prefrontal circuitry implicated in self control.  
 
A subtle difference between the dual system and the imbalance model may be 
conceptualized best calling upon the Star Trek analogy again. Captain Kirk 
and Mr. Spock had a dynamic relationship on the Starship Enterprise. Mr. 
Spock interjected his logical reasoning on the bridge when the captain was 
being irrational or illogical in his behavior or decisions. There was no need to 
impose his logic when rational decisions were being made. Similarly, in 
development, there would be no need to strengthen connections between 
prefrontal and limbic regions if there were very little limbic activity. In fact, both 
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juvenile rodents and children show little subcortical limbic activity, specifically 
in the amygdala, in the presence of a parent, even in emotionally arousing 
situations, who serves to buffer and to regulate the child’s emotions (Gee et al. 
2014; Moriceau et al., 2006). During adolescence, this effect is not evidenced 
(Gee et al., 2014). Instead there appears to be an enhanced signal in the 
amygdala during this time (e.g., Gee et al., 2014; Hare et al 2008; Monk et al., 
2003) that may help the adolescent learn to suppress their own emotions and 
actions by signaling the need for increased regulation by prefrontal circuitry. 
Signaling of prefrontal cortex could facilitate the hard wiring back from this 
region to inhibitory GABAergic cells within limbic structures, to enhance the 
capacity for regulation of emotions and actions within social bounds, and 
without the parent, in preparing for the adolescent for adult roles. This view of 
the adolescent brain underscores the need for circuit-level change within local 
and ascending connections of subcortical regions before distal descending 
prefrontal connections (see Figure 1.1).  
 
More recently, work aiming to understand how cortico-subcortical connections 
help modulate this circuitry in cognitive control tasks has begun to emerge. We 
examined changes in task-based subcortico-subcortical and cortico-
subcortical functional connectivity to emotional cues and the relationship of 
these functional connectivity changes to behavior across development (Heller 
et al., 2016). We find that amygdala-ventral striatum connectivity is inversely 
correlated with age and predictive of cognitive control performance, while 
increased medial prefrontal-amygdala connectivity is associated with better 
performance. Prefrontal-amygdala connectivity mediates the relationship 
between subcortical connectivity and cognitive control, suggesting distinct 
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roles for these circuitries in modulating cognitive control. This study, together 
with other emergent functional connectivity work (Baker et al., 2015; Silvers et 
al., 2016), suggest that between circuit modulation may be dependent on 
within circuit maturity (Casey, Cohen & Gee, submitted).  
 
All of the proposed neurobiological models of adolescence underscore the 
importance of understanding the impact of social and emotional inputs on 
cognitive control during adolescence. Each model is in part consistent with the 
self control circuitry depicted in Figure 1.1. For the sake of simplicity, we 
illustrate these changes in these components of distributed functional 
networks across development in Figure 1.1 by placing emphasis on 
connections between lateral and medial prefrontal circuits later in 
development, often implicated in supporting cognitive and affective 
computations, respectively (Crone & Steinbeis, 2017). Functional connectivity 
between neural circuits is thought to be influenced by the relative maturity 
within each circuit (Dwyer et al., 2014; Baker et al., 2015; Silvers et al., 2016; 
van den Bos et al., 2009, 2012). Refinement of subcortical connections such 
as those from the amygdala to the ventral striatum that lead to motivated 
behavior (Heller et al., 2016; Stuber et al., 2011) are thought to mature before 
long-range cortico-subcortical projections such as those from the ventromedial 
PFC to GABAergic inhibitory neurons within the amygdala that help to 
modulate motivated and emotive behaviors (Gee et al., 2013). Subsequently, 
refinement of cortico-cortico connections within distributed functional networks 
occurs that help to modulate complex thoughts, emotions and actions.  
 
Circuits or networks are the product of both experience and evolutionary-
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based biological constraints (Karmiloff-Smith, 2009). Experiences help to 
shape the development of a network that can then be modulated by another 
network, which can in turn influence behavior and experiences (Byrge et al., 
2014). Presumably the effectiveness of modulated networks relies upon 
maturation within a network and between networks, with within circuit 
development generally occurring before between network development 
(Dwyer et al., 2014; Baker et al., 2015; Silvers et al., 2016). Still, the 
relationships between the development of network connectivity and the 
development of cognitive and behavioral processes are still not well 
understood (Gu et al., 2015; Stevens, 2016).  
 
While protracted developmental trajectories of cortical circuitry (Sowell et al., 
1999; Miller et al., 2012; Mills et al., 2016) and adolescent specific sensitivities 
to social and emotional information (Steinberg, 2005; Ernst et al 2006; Casey 
et al., 2008; Blakemore & Robbins, 2012) have been observed across a large 
number of studies across species, it remains unclear exactly when and how 
cognitive control may be impacted by emotional inputs from the environment 
as functional neural circuitry continues to be refined into adulthood. An 
additional layer of intricacy has been added to these questions by a recently 
proposed model of adolescent neurobiology that highlights the influences of 
prior experiences and memory, via hippocampal circuit changes and 
alterations in mesolimbic dopamine availability, in modulating cognitive control 
throughout adolescence (Murty et al., 2016). There is presently little empirical 
work examining how emotion can impact learning and memory of events that 
may subsequently influence cognitive control behaviors across development. 
Understanding the complex influences of emotions on cognitive and neural 
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processes over the course of development may inform refinements to existing 
models of adolescent neurobiology and distinctions between typical and 
atypical patterns of behaviors that emerge during this transitional stage of 
development.  
 
The Current Thesis  
 
The goal of the current thesis is to examine the influence of both positive and 
negative brief and prolonged emotion on cognitive control and underlying 
neural circuitry across development. This dissertation research implements 
neuroimaging, psychophysiology, and two novel behavioral paradigms—one 
assessing cognitive control, the capacity to suppress attention and actions 
toward irrelevant competing information, the other memory processes, 
specifically working memory and subsequent recall memory—to investigate 
the multifaceted influences of emotions on cognitive and neural processes 
across development.  
 
The format of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 “Adolescence: When social 
and affective inputs overshadow cognitive processes– An Introduction” 
provides an overview of the current understanding of the development of 
cognitive control and the influence of emotions on both the behavioral and 
neurobiological levels (adapted from Cohen & Casey, 2017). Chapter 2 “The 
impact of emotional states on cognitive control circuitry and function” 
(Cohen et al., 2016a) provides evidence for dissociable effects of positive and 
negative emotional cues and states on cognitive control and neural processes 
in healthy adults. Chapter 3 “When is an adolescent an adult? Assessing 
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cognitive control in emotional and non-emotional contexts” (Cohen et al., 
2016b) examines the impact of both positive and negative emotional cues and 
states on cognitive control in the legally and socially relevant 18-21 age range, 
relative to younger and older age groups, and their underlying neural bases, 
based upon the paradigm described in Chapter 2. Chapter 4 “The impact of 
emotional cues on memory processes across adolescence” (Cohen et al., 
in prep) examines the effects of both positive and negative emotional content 
on subsequent memory from childhood through adulthood. The final chapter 
“Conclusions and Implications: The complex influences of emotions on 
cognitive and neural processes across development” provides a 
discussion that integrates the findings presented in the previous chapters, 
examines implications in the domains of mental health, legal, and social policy, 
and outlines future directions for this line of research. 
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Chapter 2: 
The Impact of Emotional States on Cognitive Control Circuitry and 
Function* 
 
Typically in the laboratory, cognitive and emotional processes are studied 
separately or as a stream of fleeting emotional stimuli embedded within a 
cognitive task. Yet in life, thoughts and actions often occur in more lasting 
emotional states of arousal. The current study examines the impact of 
emotions on actions using a novel behavioral paradigm and functional 
neuroimaging to assess cognitive control under sustained states of threat 
(anticipation of an aversive noise) and excitement (anticipation of winning 
money). Thirty-eight healthy adult participants were scanned while performing 
an emotional go/nogo task with positive (happy faces), negative (fearful faces) 
and neutral (calm faces) emotional cues, under threat or excitement. Cognitive 
control performance was enhanced during the excited state relative to a non-
arousing control condition. This enhanced performance was paralleled by 
heightened activity of fronto-parietal and fronto-striatal circuitry. In contrast, 
under persistent threat, cognitive control was diminished when the valence of 
the emotional cue conflicted with the emotional state. Successful task 
performance in this conflicting emotional condition was associated with 
increased activity in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), a default mode 
network region implicated in complex processes such as processing emotions 
in the context of self and monitoring performance. This region showed positive 
coupling with fronto-parietal circuitry implicated in cognitive control, providing  
 
 
* Cohen, A.O., Dellarco, D.V., Breiner, K., Helion, C., Heller, A.S., Rahdar., A., Pedersen, G., 
Chein, J., Dyke, J.P., Galvan, A., and Casey, B.J. (2016). The impact of emotional states on 
cognitive control circuitry and function. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 28(3), 446-459. 
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support for a role of the PCC in mobilizing cognitive resources to improve 
performance. These findings suggest that emotional states of arousal 
differentially modulate cognitive control and point to the potential utility of this 
paradigm for understanding effects of situational and pathological states of 
arousal on behavior.  
 
Introduction 
 
Emotions are pervasive in our everyday life experiences, present in many 
decisions we make and actions we take. For example, how we react in traffic 
on our commute to work may vary by whether we just got cut off or just got let 
into moving traffic by another commuter. Although we each experience lability 
of emotional states in our daily lives, persistence of these emotions is a 
distinguishing feature of many psychopathologies (e.g., anxiety, depression, 
bipolar disorder; borderline personality) (Carpenter & Trull, 2013; Cisler et al., 
2010; Gross & Jazaieri et al., 2014; Jazaieri et al., 2013; Joorman & Gotlib, 
2010; Sheppes et al., 2015; Townsend & Altshuler, 2010). Understanding 
influences of emotional states on cognitive and neural processes may help 
elucidate emotional conditions and processes that alter typical and atypical 
behavior. 
 
The interaction of emotion and cognition is typically examined by how well one 
can redirect attention from, or reappraise, emotional information presented in 
the form of brief emotional sounds, words, faces or pictures. These emotional 
stimuli are often embedded within well established cognitive control tasks like 
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the go/nogo (Hare et al., 2005), Stroop (Bush et al., 1998; 2000; George et al., 
1994; Whalen et al., 1998; 2006), dot probe (MacLeod et al., 1986) and 
matching tasks (Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Bishop et al., 2004) to test for either 
interference or facilitation of attention and actions. Explicit instructions also 
may be given to reappraise emotional information as non-emotional or neutral 
(Heller et al., 2013; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Wager et al., 2008). Successful 
redirection of attention from, or reappraisal of, emotional stimuli has been 
associated with cognitive control circuitry involving the prefrontal, parietal and 
anterior cingulate cortical regions (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Wager et al., 
2008), while focusing attention on this information has been associated with 
limbic brain regions (Buhle et al., 2014; Hartley & Phelps, 2010; Ochsner & 
Gross, 2005; Silvers et al., 2015; Wager et al., 2008). Fronto-parietal and 
fronto-striatal circuitry have been implicated broadly in cognitive control tasks 
(e.g. go/nogo, N-back, etc.) irrespective of the presence of emotional or 
motivational content (Owen et al., 2005; Simmonds et al., 2008; Vincent et al., 
2008; Shackman et al., 2009). Taken together, these studies implicate these 
control systems in regulating emotional and motivational processes (Davidson 
et al., 2000; Hariri et al., 2000; Hare et al., 2005; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; 
Chiew & Braver, 2011; Buhle et al., 2014).  
 
The previously described studies involve brief or momentary emotional stimuli 
rather than lasting emotional states of arousal. Emotion has also been 
examined across longer timescales in studies that induce an emotional state. 
For instance, mood induction studies use recollection of positive or negative 
autobiographical memories, guided imagery, film clips, or self-referential 
statements (Jallais & Gilet, 2010; Kohn et al., 2013; Wagner et al., 2012; 
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Westermann et al., 1996; Zhang et al., 2014) to engage and sustain an 
emotional state. Mood induction procedures have been shown to be relatively 
effective in inducing mood states but rely on subject control rather than 
experimental control, with variability among individuals (Kohn et al., 2013; 
Larcom & Isaacowitz, 2009). Other paradigms manipulate the uncertainty or 
timing of an outcome or event (Somerville et al., 2010; Alvarez et al., 2011; 
Somerville et al., 2013; Schlund et al., 2013) to induce periods of sustained 
anticipatory anxiety, as measured by self-report, psychophysiological, or 
imaging measures of mood and arousal. Few if any of these studies, however, 
have investigated how these sustained emotional states specifically impact 
cognitive control. Examining decision-making under emotional states of a 
longer timescale, with experimental control, may provide a more ecologically 
valid framework with which to understand the effects of real life emotional 
situations and/or pathological states of arousal on behavior.  
 
The valence of emotional stimuli and states may differentially impact cognitive 
processes.  A number of studies using discrete emotional stimuli have found 
that both appetitive and threat cues can interfere with cognitive control  (Chiew 
& Braver, 2011; Hare et al., 2005; Hariri et al., 2000; Teslovich et al., 2014). 
Meanwhile, studies exploring the cognitive impacts of sustained emotional 
states have found differential effects dependent on the valence of the emotion. 
Specifically, positive mood states have been shown to broaden the scope of 
attention and improve cognitive performance in problem solving, memory 
recall, and decision-making (Ashby et al., 1999; Isen, 2000; Ashby et al., 2002; 
Frederickson & Branigan, 2005; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011) whereas, negative 
emotional states are associated with narrowing of attentional focus and 
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decreased cognitive capacity that results in diminished task performance 
(Easterbrook, 1959; Chajut & Algom, 2003; Frederickson & Branigan, 2005; 
Liston et al., 2009; Steenbergen et al., 2011).  
 
The current study tests dissociable effects of both positive and negative 
emotional cues and sustained emotional states on cognitive control and neural 
processes within a variation of the emotional go/nogo task (Hare et al., 2005). 
Participants perform this task when “excited” about possibly winning up to 
$100 and when feeling “threatened” by the anticipation of an aversive sound. 
We hypothesized that negative and positive cues would similarly impact 
cognitive control capacity, while negative and positive mood states would 
differentially affect cognitive control (i.e., negative emotional states would 
diminish cognitive performance while positive emotional states would enhance 
performance). Likewise, we hypothesized that prefrontal and parietal control 
circuitry would be differentially modulated by sustained emotional states. We 
tested for dissociable differences in behavioral performance and brain activity 
to sustained emotional states and emotional cues and then explored 
interactive effects of emotional state and emotionally valenced cues on 
cognitive control. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
Fifty healthy right-handed adults, ages 21 to 25 years, were scanned. Data 
from two participants were excluded due to poor overall performance (more 
than 2 standard deviations below the group’s average performance as 
measured by d-prime). Data from four participants were excluded due to 
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excessive head motion (greater than 10% of time points censored as defined 
by >1.56 mm translational or 1 degree rotational motion within a run) and data 
from six participants were excluded due to technical problems. A total of 38 
usable scans (18 males and 20 females; mean age = 23.61; SD = 1.34) are 
reported in the final analyses. Participants were recruited from a diverse 
community sample in New York City and Los Angeles as part of an on-going 
multisite project, and self identified as Caucasian (31.6%), African American 
(28.9%), Asian (23.7%), and Hispanic (15.8%). Participants reported no use of 
psychotropic medications or past diagnoses of, or treatment for, psychiatric or 
neurological disorders. All participants provided informed written consent 
approved by the Institutional Review Boards at both data collection sites. 
 
Experimental Task 
During the fMRI scan, participants completed a modified emotional go/nogo 
paradigm (Hare et al. 2005) that consisted of happy, fear and calm emotional 
expressions as both targets and nontargets (Figure 1A)—the Cognitive Control 
Under Emotion (CCUE) task. The task was performed under three emotional 
state conditions: while anticipating a negative event (threat), a positive event 
(excitement), or no event (neutral).  Each condition was denoted with a 
distinctly colored background (Figure 1B). Participants practiced the task prior 
to entering the scanner to ensure that they understood the instructions and 
conditions.  
 
The negative emotional state of threat (depicted on the blue background) was 
induced using verbal instruction of an unpredictable aversive auditory 
stimulus, previously used successfully in fear conditioning (Soliman et al., 
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2010; Pattwell et al 2012), paired with an image representing a megaphone. 
The unpredictable nature of the potential to hear the noise maintains the 
sustained state of potential threat (Davis et al., 2010; Phelps et al., 2001).  
Verbal instruction of the possibility of winning up to $100 (depicted on the 
purple background) was used to induce a sustained positive emotional state of 
arousal (excitement) and was paired with the image and sound of a slot 
machine. Participants were instructed that the probability of an event 
occurring, the volume of the noise or the amount of money won, was not tied 
to their performance, but rather, was determined by the computer and would 
occur randomly, only when the background screen was the instructed color. In 
reality, participants heard the noise and won $20 exactly once over the course 
of the task, in a pseudorandomized order. The relevant event always occurred 
near the end of an experimental run so that the sustained emotional state 
Figure 2.1: Experimental Paradigm. Examples of each facial type used in the 
paradigm: fear, happy, and calm (A). Schematic of one run of the emotional 
go/nogo imaging task with emotional cues as targets (go) or nontargets 
(nogo) (B). Cues occur within blocks of sustained negative emotion 
(unpredictable aversive noise), positive emotion (unpredictable reward), and 
neutral (no event), indicated by the background color of the screen (yellow, 
blue, or purple).  
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associated with anticipation of the event would have maximal duration, and so 
that TRs occurring subsequent to the event could be excised from analyses (to 
remove any potential artifact of the event). During a third state (depicted with a 
yellow background), participants were told there was no chance of any event 
occurring as they completed the task. Each state (75-second duration) 
occurred twice during each run. 
 
Data were acquired in six 8-minute and 2-second runs representing each 
combination of emotional expression (calm, fear, happy) as a go or a nogo 
stimulus using a mixed block/event-related design. Run orders of the 
emotional go/nogo were pseudocounterbalanced and background 
color/emotional state pairings were counterbalanced. At the beginning of each 
run, participants were instructed which emotional expression was the target 
and reminded of the colored background/emotional state pairings. Participants 
answered a series of four questions to assure they were aware of each of 
these contingencies prior to the outset of each run. Participants were queried 
about the potential event associated with each of the three colored 
backgrounds in a yes/no format (e.g. “Does this color screen mean that you 
could win up to $100”) and were asked to confirm the target facial expression 
type (e.g. “Which face are you pushing for?”). Feedback was provided after 
each question, reiterating the contingencies. For each trial, a face appeared 
for 500 ms followed by a jittered intertrial interval (2-7 s). A total of 114 trials 
were presented in each run in a pseudorandomized order (84 go, 30 nogo 
across all cue types). In total, 60 nogo and 168 go trials, across all three cue 
types, were acquired for each emotional state for a total of 48 minutes and 12 
seconds.  
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Behavioral and Psychophysiological Data Acquisition 
Participants completed a final screening for MRI safety before being 
positioned in the scanner, with a 5-button (NY) or 4-button (LA) MR-
compatible button box. The experimental task was presented using E-Prime 
1.0 (NY) or 2.0 (LA) and was projected onto a flat screen mounted in the 
scanner bore. Participants viewed the screen via a mirror mounted on a 12-
channel head coil. Skin conductance response (SCR) was acquired using 
disposable, isotonic gel electrodes, which were attached to the first and 
second fingers of the left hand between the first and second phalanges. The 
electrode cables were grounded through a RF filter panel. The skin 
conductance signal was recorded and amplified using a Biopac recording 
system and AcqKnowledge 4.0 (Biopac, Goleta, CA) software during fMRI 
scanning (200 Hz sampling). E-prime software was used to indicate the 
onset/offset of the emotional state during the task (Lim et al., 1997). SCR data 
were acquired from 48 of the 50 participants. 
 
After exiting the scanner, participants were asked to answer debriefing 
questions about the believability of task conditions. Participants were asked 
how much they expected to win money or hear the noise during the block color 
that corresponded to the verbal instruction (e.g. “Did you expect to win money 
more during the purple blocks than the blue or yellow blocks?”). Each question 
consisted of a seven-point scale (1 = not at all; 7 = very much). Thirty-eight 
participants completed the post-scan questionnaire. 
 
fMRI Data Acquisition 
35 
 
Whole brain fMRI data was acquired using Siemens Magnetom Trio 3.0 Tesla 
scanners located at the Citigroup Biomedical Imaging Center at Weill Cornell 
Medical College (WCMC) or at the University of California, Los Angeles. 
Scanning parameters were identical across data collection sites. A high 
resolution, T1 weighted magnetization-prepared rapid-acquisition gradient 
echo (MPRAGE) sequence scan was acquired using BIRN optimized 
sequences (Jovicich et al., 2006) (repetition time [TR] of 2170ms, echo time 
[TE] of 4.33 ms, 256-mm field of view [FOV], 160 slices, 1.0-mm x 1.0-mm x 
1.2-mm sagittal slices). Functional images were acquired using T2*-sensitive 
echo planar pulse sequences covering the full brain. Thirty-eight 4-mm thick 
axial slices were acquired per 2500 ms TR (TE=30 ms; FOV=200-mm; Flip 
angle = 90°, 3.1 x 3.1 x 4.0 mm voxels).  
 
Behavioral Data Analysis 
Behavioral data were analyzed for accuracy using the sensitivity index d-prime 
that incorporates both accurate hits and false alarms (Macmillan & Creelman, 
2004). D-prime was calculated by subtracting normalized false alarm rate from 
normalized go accuracy. Behavioral data, stimulus timing, and emotional state 
timing information were extracted and calculated using MATLAB and Statistics 
Toolbox Release 2013b. All statistical analyses were conducted using R 
(release 3.1.0). Main effects of emotional cue and state, and the emotional cue 
by state interaction, were analyzed using repeated measures analyses of the 
variance (ANOVAs) models controlling for sex and scanning site as between 
subject variables and with Bonferroni corrected post-hoc t-tests to determine 
statistical significance between conditions.  
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We examined responses to debriefing questions and SCR to assess the 
efficacy of our emotional state manipulation. A 1 Hz filter was applied to raw 
SCR data. Data was smoothed for each subject, and individuals with no 
discernable variation in SCR across runs were excluded, leaving 31 of the 48 
participants in the analyses. SCR slope was extracted for each emotional state 
block within each run and was z-scored within each subject to account for 
individual differences in SCR. Slope values across each emotional state 
(excite, threat, and neutral) were then averaged. Change in skin conductance 
was computed as a difference scores between SCR slope values in an 
emotional state versus neutral. Given the directionality of our hypotheses with 
respect to these validation measures, one-tailed one sample Student’s t-tests 
were performed to test whether debriefing questions were significantly 
different from one (the lowest value on the seven-point scale) and whether 
SCR differences were significantly different from zero.  
 
fMRI Data Analysis 
Image Processing.  Functional imaging data were preprocessed and analyzed 
using Analysis of Functional NeuroImages (AFNI) software (Cox, 1996). 
Preprocessing of functional scans included correction for slice time acquisition 
using sinc interpolation, volume registration using 6-parameter rigid-body 
transformation to account for head motion, and normalization to Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) 152 1-mm T1 template using 12-parameter affine 
transformation and non-linear transformations (3dQWarp) were performed. 
Data were resampled to 3-mm isotropic voxels and were smoothed using a 
full-width at half maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel of 6-mm. Signal intensity 
of each voxel time series was normalized to percent signal change. Three 
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individual general linear models (GLM) were created for each participant to 
estimate separate aspects of the task: 1) Activation to emotional cues and 
sustained emotional states, 2) cue-state interactions, and 3) functional 
connectivity for the cue-state interactions. 
 
Image Analysis.  To disentangle the neural responses to the cues and to the 
sustained states, which were presented simultaneously, each participant’s 
GLM included 16 regressors: Six task regressors consisting of correct 
responses to the emotional cues (fear, happy, and calm go trials and fear, 
happy and calm nogo trials). In the same model, three regressors were 
included to model the longer (30 TRs) sustained emotional states (i.e., the 
threat, excite and neutral sustained states). We also included a regressor 
corresponding to the incorrect trials (both go and nogo), as well six motion 
parameters. Baseline trends were estimated to capture shifts in signal change. 
Cues were modeled using a three parameter SPM gamma hemodynamic-
response function (HRF); the sustained states were modeled using a single 
parameter block HRF. Time points with >1.56 mm (half voxel) of motion were 
censored as well as the preceding and following time points. 
 
To examine cue-state interactions, a second GLM was run and consisted of 19 
task regressors. In this GLM, each task regressor corresponded to the specific 
cue and sustained state. For example, the regressors incorporated information 
for each task and state  (e.g., Threat-Calm-Go, Threat-Calm-Nogo, Threat-
Happy-Go, Threat-Happy-Nogo, etc). Incorrect trials were modeled as a 
separate regressor, six motion regressors, motion censoring, and baseline 
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trend estimations were incorporated in this model, as in the previous model. 
Regressors were convolved with a three parameter SPM gamma HRF.  
 
These individual level GLMs were submitted to group linear mixed-effects 
(LME) analyses using the AFNI 3dLME function (Chen et al., 2013), which is 
robust to small amounts of missing data. All group level analyses included a 
random intercept for each participant as well as sex and scanning site as 
between subject covariates. The first group level LME model assessed the 
main effect of the transient cues (the go as well as the nogo trials). The 
second group level LME model assessed the main effect of the sustained 
state (threat, excite, neutral). Lastly, given the observed behavioral interaction 
between emotional state and happy cue, a third group LME model directly 
paralleling the behavioral performance finding assessed the neural interaction 
of the sustained emotional state (threat and excite) with positive cue (happy). 
Group analyses were thresholded at p < .05 corrected for multiple 
comparisons using Monte Carlo simulation via the 3dClustSim program in 
AFNI. Individual subject regression coefficients were extracted from regions 
with significant main effects of emotional state and submitted to offline post-
hoc analyses in R. 
 
Psychophysiological Interaction Analysis. A generalized psychophysiological 
interaction (gPPI) analysis (McLaren et al., 2012; Cisler et al., 2014) was 
conducted in AFNI to examine task-dependent connectivity across the whole 
brain. The seed region was identified in the activation contrast of threat versus 
excite state to happy cue-- the posterior cingulate cortex. Briefly, the gPPI 
analysis was carried out by removing sources of noise and artifact, 
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deconvolving the neural signal, extracting the functional time course within the 
seed region (5-mm sphere around peak activation), and convolving the time 
course data with task timings and the canonical hemodynamic response 
function (McLaren et al., 2012; Cisler et al., 2014). The 19 task regressor 
individual GLM examining cue-state interactions, described above, was 
implemented, but for the gPPI analysis also included the seed time course and 
each time course/task interaction regressor for a total of 39 regressors plus 
the six motions regressors. Consistent with the analysis yielding the seed 
region, a group LME model, also controlling for sex and scanning site, was 
used to test the specific interaction of emotional state (threat and excite) with 
positive cue (happy). Group results for the threat state versus excitement state 
across target type contrast were thresholded at p < 0.05, corrected for multiple 
comparisons at the whole brain level using 3dClustSim, as described 
previously. 
  
Results 
Validation of Paradigm 
To ensure that performance did not drop due to the long duration of the task, 
we examined differences in overall d-prime between the first and last run and 
found no significant differences in performance (t(64.64) = 0.13, p > 0.25). We 
examined self-report measures and psychophysiology to assess the efficacy 
of the experimental manipulation. Self-reported responses to debriefing 
questionnaires and skin conductance response slope differences to emotional 
states were tested independently, so we used a Bonferroni adjusted alpha less 
than 0.025 to assess questionnaire response statistical significance and to 
assess change in SCR significance. Participants expected both the money 
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(t(38) = 14.96, p < 0.0001) and loud noise (t(38) = 15.48, p < 0.0001) to occur 
during the instructed blocks (Figure 2A). Participants showed positive mean 
slope differences of SCR to both emotional states relative to neutral (Figure 
2B). Although only the difference between the excite state and neutral was 
statistically significant (t(30) = 2.23, p = 0.016; threat – neutral, t(30) = 1.11, p = 
0.14), SCR difference scores for the excite and threat conditions were not 
significantly different from each other (t(30) = 1.14, p = 0.26).  
 
Behavioral Results 
To tease apart the effects of emotional cue versus emotional states on task 
performance, we examined d-prime to cues within the neutral state and d-
prime to calm cues across emotional states. Repeated measures ANOVAs 
showed no main effect of cue type on performance (F(2,74) = 1.58, p = 0.21) 
(Figure 3A) but did reveal a main effect of emotional state (F(2,74) = 4.38, p = 
Figure 2.2: Validation of Paradigm. Participants expected to both win 
money and hear the loud noise during the instructed block (A). Participants 
also showed similar effects in skin conductance response in the emotional 
states relative to neutral (B). Means ± standard error (s.e.) presented. 
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0.016) (Figure 3B). Post-hoc bonferroni adjusted t-tests showed that this main 
effect was primarily driven by the difference between the state of excitement 
and neutral (t(37) = 2.87, p = 0.02; threat versus neutral t(37) = 1.59, p > 0.25; 
excite versus threat t(37)= 1.39, p > 0.25). Assessing across all emotional cues 
and states, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA showed an emotional state 
by cue interaction (F(4,148) = 3.57, p = 0.008) (Figure 3C). The largest effect of 
emotional state appeared to be on performance to happy cues across the 
three emotional states of excite, threat, and neutral (Figure 5A). Thus, we 
submitted these data to post-hoc tests. Bonferroni adjusted t-tests revealed 
that participants showed enhanced performance to happy cues in the excite 
condition relative to neutral (t(37) = 3.05, p = 0.013), diminished performance in 
the threat condition relative to neutral (t(37) = 2.61, p = 0.039), and a 
pronounced difference in performance between excite and threat (t(37) = 6.29, 
p < 0.0001). 
Figure 2.3: Sustained states of emotion influence performance to non-
emotional and emotional cues. Behavioral performance dissociating 
emotional cue (A) from emotional state (B) and interactions between 
emotional states and cues (C). Means ± s.e. presented. * = p < 0.05, ***= p 
< 0.0001 
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Imaging results 
Main effects of emotional state and cue 
Consistent with previous imaging studies using go/nogo tasks, in this variation 
we observed greater ipsilateral cerebellum (Z = 7.34, p < 0.01, corrected) and 
contralateral precentral gyrus (Z = 4.12, p < 0.01, corrected) activation to go 
trials relative to nogo trials and increased right (Z = -3.81, p < 0.05, corrected) 
and left (Z = -4.15, p < 0.01, corrected) inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) activation to 
nogo trials relative to go trials (Table 1). In studies implementing the emotional 
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go/nogo task across development, we have previously observed a correlation 
of right IFG BOLD signal change on nogo versus go trials and overall 
proportion of false alarms across ages (Somerville et al., 2011). In this sample 
of adult participants, we find a similar association (r(36) = 0.31, p = 0.0549) 
that was not observed for fronto-parietal regions (r(36) = 0.199, p = 0.230; 
parietal r(36) = 0.255, p = 0.121). In line with behavioral findings, no brain 
regions showed a main effect of cue that survived correction for multiple 
comparisons. The activation map for the main effect of emotional state 
revealed eleven regions showing differences in sustained activation (Table 2).  
 
Given the behavioral findings of enhanced performance under a state of 
excitement, post-hoc tests were performed on the beta values extracted from 
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the four largest regions of activation, comparing activations between states 
using Bonferroni adjusted t-tests (Figure 4). These regions all showed 
relatively increased sustained activity in the excite state as compared to both 
the neutral and threat states: right parietal cortex (excite versus neutral t(37) = 
4.55, p < 0.001; excite versus threat t(37)= 4.73, p < 0.0001; threat versus 
neutral t(37) = 0.18, p > 0.25), right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (excite versus 
neutral t(37) = 5.11, p < 0.0001; excite versus threat t(37)= 3.93, p = 0.001; threat 
versus neutral t(37) = 2.32, p = 0.077), right inferior frontal gyrus and insula 
(excite versus neutral t(37) = 3.97, p < 0.001; excite versus threat t(37)= 4.01, p < 
0.001; threat versus neutral t(37) = 0.06, p > 0.25), and left striatum (excite 
versus neutral t(37) = 4.49, p < 0.001; excite versus threat t(37)= 4.26, p < 0.001; 
threat versus neutral t(37) = 0.43, p > 0.25). Of these regions, only activation of 
the striatum was positively correlated with performance as measured by d-
prime (r(36) = 0.355, p = 0.029). Sustained activity in this region was positively 
correlated with sustained activity in the prefrontal (r(36) = 0.625, p < 0.0001) 
and parietal regions (r(36) = 0.446, p = 0.005) during the excite state. 
45 
 
Interactive Effects of Emotional State and Cue  
We focused our analysis on the observed behavioral interaction between 
emotional cue and state (Figure 5A). Specifically, we compared BOLD signal 
to happy cues under threat versus under excitement. A single cluster survived 
whole brain correction, showing greater activation for the threat than excite 
state, in the posterior cingulate cortex (x = -11.5, y = 44.5, z = 27.5, Z = 4.33, 
cluster: 38 voxels, p < 0.01, corrected). PCC activation was enhanced when 
successfully engaging cognitive control on trials for which participants showed 
the most difficulty in performance.  
 
Figure 2.4: Heightened fronto-striatal and fronto-parietal activity under 
excitement. Representative axial images and extracted beta weights from 
regions showing a main effect of emotional state at p < .01, whole brain 
corrected. All brain regions show a similar pattern of increased sustained 
activation under a state of excitement relative to neutral and threat 
conditions. Means ± s.e. presented. **= p < 0.001, ***= p < 0.0001 
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A whole-brain generalized PPI analysis yielded seven clusters of voxels 
showing significantly greater functional connectivity with the PCC in the threat 
versus the excite condition to happy faces (see Table 3). Areas showing 
greater functional coupling included fronto-parietal regions (Figure 5B) as well 
as dorsal anterior and middle cingulate regions. Functional connectivity 
parameter estimates were extracted from the fronto-parietal clusters and post-
hoc t-tests were performed on lateral prefrontal cortex (t(37) = 5.01, p < 0.0001) 
and both parietal regions (right and left betas collapsed; t(37) = 4.91, p < 
0.0001). Functional connectivity parameter estimates did not show significant 
correlations with behavioral data. These findings show greater positive 
coupling between the posterior cingulate cortex and fronto-parietal control 
Figure 2.5: Diminished processing of positive information under threat. (A) 
Behavioral performance as indexed by d-prime to happy cues during states 
of excitement versus threat; (B) localization of brain activity in posterior 
cingulate cortex and seed-based functional connectivity with this region in 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and bilateral parietal cortex to happy cues 
during states of threat versus excitement. Means ± s.e. presented. **= p < 
0.001, ***= p < 0.0001 
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circuitry when the emotional cue and emotional state are in conflict (i.e., a 
smiling face when under threat). 
 
Discussion 
Emotional triggers and prolonged emotional states are believed to influence 
thoughts and actions, yet there has been relatively little investigation of how 
different emotional states directly influence cognitive control capacity and the 
underlying neural circuitry. The current study shows that, in healthy adults, 
brief presentations of emotional cues do not significantly enhance or diminish 
cognitive control capacity, whereas sustained states of emotion alter this 
capacity. Under sustained states of excitement, when participants thought they 
could win as much as $100 irrespective of their task performance, they 
showed enhanced cognitive performance. This finding is consistent with 
previous research suggesting that positive affect may broaden the scope of 
attention on cognitive tasks and improve performance (Ashby et al., 1999; 
Isen, 2000; Ashby et al., 2002; Frederickson & Branigan, 2005).  
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Improved performance under excitement was paralleled by increased 
sustained BOLD activation of fronto-parietal and fronto-striatal circuitry during 
this positive emotional state. Activation of these circuitries has been 
associated with performance in various cognitive control tasks (Owen et al., 
2005; Liston et al., 2006; Simmonds et al., 2008; Vincent et al., 2008; 
Shackman et al., 2009; Buhle et al., 2014). Specifically, fronto-parietal circuitry 
has been implicated widely in cognitive control and attention processes, while 
fronto-striatal activity, including that in the inferior frontal gyrus, has been 
implicated more specifically in response inhibition (Hare et al., 2005; Liston et 
al., 2006; Vincent et al., 2008; Shackman et al., 2009; Heatherton & Wagner, 
2011; Dodds et al., 2011; Aron et al., 2014; White et al., 2014). Activity in the 
striatum was positively correlated with performance and with activity in 
prefrontal and parietal regions. The sustained increase in recruitment of these 
circuits throughout the state of excitement together with enhanced 
performance is consistent with heightened representation of task demands 
(Miller & Cohen, 2001; Waskom et al., 2014) that in turn facilitates cognitive 
control capacity.  
 
In contrast to the improvement in cognitive control under a positive state of 
excitement, this ability was diminished under sustained threat. However, this 
diminished capacity was dependent on the type of emotional information being 
processed. When the emotional cue conflicted with the emotional state (e.g., a 
smiling face under threat) behavioral performance declined. The presence of 
an emotional cue like a smiling face when under a state of potential threat is 
strikingly inconsistent with the negative emotional experience. This conflict at 
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the emotional level is not dissimilar from cognitive conflict observed when two 
cognitive inputs compete for attention, resulting in the need for more cognitive 
control (Botvinick et al., 1999; Casey et al., 2000). In the cognitive control 
literature, the anterior cingulate cortex has been implicated in resolving this 
form of conflict (Botvinick et al., 1999; Bush et al., 2000; Casey et al., 2000; 
Fan et al., 2008). In the current study, the conflict is between an emotional 
input and an emotional state. We show that this form of emotional conflict is 
associated with posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) activity.  
 
The PCC is a major hub of the default mode network (DMN) that has been 
implicated in processing positive and negative affect in the context of self 
(Maddock et al., 2001; Maddock et al., 2003; Brewer et al., 2013). Non-human 
primate research has shown that the PCC has diffuse structural connections 
throughout the brain, including with other parts of cingulate cortex and 
association cortices in the frontal and parietal lobes (Parvizi et al., 2006; Leech 
& Sharp, 2013). Although there is still little consensus regarding the 
computational functions of the PCC (Leech & Sharp, 2013), evidence from 
nonhuman primate research suggests that the neuronal firing in the PCC is 
involved in complex processes such as performance monitoring and salience 
detection in motivated goal-directed cognition (Heilbronner et al., 2011; 
Pearson et al., 2011; Heilbronner & Platt, 2013; Leech & Sharp, 2013). It is 
hypothesized that a role of the default mode network may be to flexibly 
allocate cognitive resources in cognitively demanding situations in order to 
facilitate changes in behaviors that lead to successful task performance 
(Hayden et al., 2008; Pearson et al., 2009; 2011; Heilbronner et al., 2011; 
Leech et al., 2012; Heilbronner & Platt, 2013).   
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When the emotional cue conflicted with the negative emotional state the PCC 
showed positive coupling with fronto-parietal control circuitry.  Consistent with 
the work in nonhuman primates, recent converging evidence in humans shows 
positive functional connectivity of default mode network hubs, including the 
PCC, with fronto-parietal networks when subjects are engaged in a goal-
directed task. This heightened task-based connectivity is thought to represent 
the phenomenon proposed in nonhuman primate research of the PCC 
potentially mobilizing additional cognitive resources when necessary 
(Heilbronner & Platt, 2013; Leech et al., 2012; Pearson et al., 2011; Spreng et 
al., 2010). Thus, during this condition of conflicting emotional information, 
where participants are exhibiting the most difficulty performing the task, we 
observe relatively increased activity in the PCC and positive functional 
coupling with cingulate and fronto-parietal circuitry for correct trials. These 
results are consistent with a role for the PCC in mobilizing neural resources in 
cognitively taxing conditions. 
 
An alternative interpretation of these data comes from the human resting-state 
fMRI literature. Studies of resting-state functional connectivity shed light on the 
functional organization and architecture of neural networks. Healthy subjects 
generally show negative connectivity, or inverse coupling, between DMN 
regions and task-relevant networks. Due in part to the high resting-state 
activity of DMN regions such as the PCC, it is thought that the commonly 
observed negative coupling is a reflection of redirecting attention outward from 
focusing inward on self (Uddin et al., 2009; Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 2012; 
Leech & Sharp, 2013). Many psychiatric disorders characterized by cognitive 
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control problems show the opposite pattern of positive connectivity between 
default and control networks, including schizophrenia and depression 
(Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 2012; Leech & Sharp, 2013). These alterations in 
resting state neural circuitry are thought to reflect components of the 
pathology, such as difficulties with redirection of attention and increased 
rumination. Thus, the heightened functional connectivity observed when 
emotional input and emotional state conflict in combination with diminished 
cognitive control is reminiscent of altered resting-state connectivity in 
psychiatric populations characterized by cognitive control problems. 
 
Although simultaneous processing of conflicting negative and positive 
emotions diminished cognitive control capacity and elicited greater activity in 
the PCC for correct trials in the context of smiling faces under threat, the 
opposite pattern of behavior was shown when a fearful face occurred in the 
positive state of excitement. One potential explanation for this seemingly 
conflicting result is that fearful faces may be ambiguous stimuli that do not 
provide contextual information (Davis & Whalen, 2001). Several studies have 
suggested that positive or negative emotional context can bias the 
interpretation of ambiguous facial expressions (Kim et al., 2004; Neta et al., 
2011). In the present study, the prevailing positive emotional context 
(anticipation of winning money) may influence the interpretation of ambiguous 
stimuli such as a fearful face as surprise rather than threat thus reducing the 
degree of conflict in the different forms of emotional information. Specifically, 
performance was enhanced to fearful relative to neutral faces in the positive 
emotional state. This interpretation is consistent with general improvements in 
cognition when experiencing positive affect (Ashby et al., 1999; Isen, 2000; 
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Ashby et al., 2002; Frederickson & Branigan, 2005).   
 
While healthy adults show diminished performance and differential recruitment 
of task-related circuitry when faced with conflicting emotional information, it is 
still unclear how competing emotional inputs may differentially influence 
cognitive control and neural processes in different conditions, such as in 
developmental or psychiatric populations. Adolescence is a time of heightened 
sensitivity to emotional and social inputs (Casey, 2015), thus understanding 
complex influences of emotions on cognitive and neural processes during this 
typical stage of development may provide further insights into situational 
effects on behavior. Furthermore, emotional problems are hallmarks of a wide 
range of psychopathologies (Carpenter & Trull, 2013; Cisler et al., 2010; 
Joorman & Gotlib, 2010; Townsend & Altshuler, 2010) that peak during this 
developmental period with one in five adolescents meeting criteria for a mental 
illness (Kessler et al., 2005; Merikangas et al., 2010) highlighting the 
importance of developmental considerations in this line of research (Lee et al., 
2014; Casey et al 2015). The influence of emotions on cognitive and neural 
processes in developmental and psychiatric populations is a primary area of 
empirical investigation and one that may have important implications for 
clinical assessment and interventions that may improve outcomes (Davidson 
et al., 2002; Gross & Jazaieri, 2014; Lee et al., 2014; Sheppes et al., 2015). 
The behavioral paradigm reported in the present study may be useful in 
probing the complex interactions between cognition and emotion in 
developmental and psychiatric populations. 
 
The findings reported here must be considered in light of their limitations. We 
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here refer to the sustained states of positive arousal and negative arousal as 
“excitement” and “threat”, respectively. However, we do not have a measure of 
these mood states to directly assess how the participants were feeling. 
Additionally, although we observed significantly increased skin conductance 
across the excite state relative to neutral, the increase in skin conductance in 
the threat state relative to neutral was not significantly different from zero. 
Much of the SCR data collected was not usable and there was significant 
variability in the data. Data may have been particularly noisy because it was 
acquired in the scanner and because subjects viewed brief emotional cues 
throughout each state block. Examining SCR data in a larger sample may help 
to increase power and reduce noise. It is also possible that some participants 
did not find the loud noise as aversive as others did although this stimulus has 
been validated as aversive in previous imaging research (Levita et al., 2009; 
Soliman et al., 2010). Investigating individual differences in responses to these 
induced emotional states may yield further insight into how emotion 
differentially impacts cognitive control among individuals. 
 
The present study implements a novel neuroimaging paradigm for examining 
how emotional information and states impact attention and actions, for better 
or worse. We demonstrate that emotional states and cues have dissociable 
and interacting influences on cognitive control processes and on the 
underlying neural circuitry. Our findings suggest that sustained positive states 
are associated with improvements in performance in healthy adults, while 
conflicting positive emotional information under a negative state diminishes 
performance and alters neural activation and connectivity. Understanding 
complex influences of emotions on cognitive and neural processes in healthy 
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participants is a first step toward delineating conditions (e.g., pathological, 
developmental or environmental) for which emotional processes may alter 
behavior. 
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Chapter 3: 
When Is an Adolescent an Adult? Assessing Cognitive Control in 
Emotional and Nonemotional Contexts* 
 
An individual is typically considered an adult at age 18, although the age of 
adulthood varies for different legal and social policies. A key question is how 
cognitive capacities relevant to these policies change with development. The 
current study used an emotional go/no-go paradigm and functional 
neuroimaging to assess cognitive control under sustained states of negative 
and positive arousal in a community sample of one hundred ten 13- to 25-
year-olds from New York City and Los Angeles. The results showed 
diminished cognitive performance under brief and prolonged negative 
emotional arousal in 18- to 21-year-olds relative to adults over 21. This 
reduction in performance was paralleled by decreased activity in fronto-
parietal circuitry, implicated in cognitive control, and increased sustained 
activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, involved in emotional processes. 
The findings suggest a developmental shift in cognitive capacity in emotional 
situations that coincides with dynamic changes in prefrontal circuitry. These 
findings may inform age-related social policies. 
 
* Cohen, A.O., Breiner, K., Steinberg, L., Bonnie, R.J., Scott, E.S., Taylor-Thompson, K.A., 
Rudolph, M.D., Chein, J., Richeson, J.A, Heller, A.S., Silverman, M.R., Dellarco, D.V., Fair, 
D.A., Galvan, A., and Casey, B.J. (2016). When is an adolescent an adult? Assessing 
cognitive control in emotional and non-emotional contexts. Psychological Science, 27(4), 549 
– 562. 
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Introduction 
 
Definitions of adulthood in the United States differ according to state law and 
policy. Although most states set the age of majority at 18, the legal age for 
purchasing alcohol is 21 (Institute of Medicine & National Research Council, 
2014), and the minimum age for criminal prosecution is 14 or younger in most 
states (Taylor-Thompson, 2014). In scientific studies, 18 is often used as the 
cutoff for adulthood even though government research policies, until recently, 
considered individuals under 21 to be minors. Thus, the legal definition of 
adulthood is fluid and imprecise. One consideration in defining adulthood is 
when behavior, and the underlying neural circuitry, can be said to have 
reached maturity. Extant studies suggest that this may vary depending on the 
context in which adolescents are assessed. In the current study, we compared 
the development of cognitive control in neutral and emotionally arousing 
situations because the latter seem highly relevant to many policies relating to 
definitions of adulthood. 
 
Although a large developmental literature shows that adolescents’ speed and 
accuracy on simple cognitive tasks can resemble adults’ (Luna, Marek, 
Larsen, Tervo-Clemmens, & Chahal, 2015), mounting evidence suggests that 
contextual factors influence performance differentially as a function of age. 
Studies show that adolescence, typically defined as ages 13 through 17, is a 
time of heightened sensitivity to motivational, social, and emotional information 
(Casey, 2015; Steinberg, 2010). Specifically, during adolescence, cognitive-
control capacities and decision making appear to be especially influenced by 
incentives (Galvan et al., 2006; Geier, Terwilliger, Teslovich, Velanova, & 
57 
 
Luna, 2010; Somerville, Hare, & Casey, 2011; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010), 
threats (Cohen-Gilbert & Thomas, 2013; Dreyfuss et al., 2014; Grose-Fifer, 
Rodrigues, Hoover, & Zottoli, 2013; Hare et al., 2008), and peers (Chein, 
Albert, O’Brien, Uckert, & Steinberg, 2011; Gardner & Steinberg, 2005). 
Behavioral regulation in response to these inputs has been shown to rely on 
prefrontal circuitry (Dreyfuss et al., 2014; Hare et al., 2008; Somerville et al., 
2011), which shows marked change into the early 20s (Gogtay et al., 2004; 
Sowell et al., 2004). 
 
Prominent neurobiological theories of adolescence suggest that dynamic and 
asymmetric trajectories in structural and functional development of limbic and 
prefrontal circuitry are implicated in motivated behavior and its control, 
respectively, and may lead to a propensity toward risky and impulsive actions 
(Casey, 2015; Casey, Getz, & Galvan, 2008; Ernst, Pine, & Hardin, 2006; 
Mills, Goddings, Clasen, Giedd, & Blakemore, 2014; Steinberg, 2010). 
Phylogenetically older brain regions, such as subcortical limbic regions, show 
nonlinear developmental changes and appear to be functionally sensitized 
during adolescence (Galvan et al., 2006; Hare et al., 2008; Raznahan et al., 
2014), whereas development of prefrontal cortex (PFC) exhibits a roughly 
linear trajectory (Galvan et al., 2006; Gogtay et al., 2004; Sowell et al., 2004). 
Resting-state functional connectivity data show prolonged development of 
long-range cortical connectivity that does not stabilize until the 20s 
(Dosenbach et al., 2011; Fair et al., 2009). Together, these results suggest 
continued refinement of brain circuitry, particularly prefrontal cortical circuitry, 
into young adulthood, but the behavioral implications of this protracted brain 
development remain unclear. 
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The current study compared the development of cognitive control under brief 
and prolonged states of emotional arousal and nonemotional states. We 
focused on the 18-to-21 age range given the protracted development of 
prefrontal circuitry and the particular legal and social relevance of this age 
group. Our key premise was that responses in emotional situations would 
provide insight on cognitive capacities relevant to social and legal policy, such 
as those related to criminal responsibility and accountability. Prior research 
examining motivational and social influences on cognitive capacities in young 
adults has used varying age ranges and experimental manipulations that have 
produced mixed results (Chein et al., 2011; Cohen-Gilbert et al., 2014; Silva, 
Shulman, Chein, & Steinberg, 2015; Steinberg et al., 2009). We attempted to 
control for several of these variables by testing the impact of both brief and 
sustained positive and negative emotional states on cognitive control, using 
predefined age groups as well as age as a continuous variable. We 
hypothesized that there would be a developmental shift in cognitive control in 
emotional situations that would correspond to dynamic changes in prefrontal 
circuitry. Specifically, we predicted that young adults 18 to 21 years old would 
differ from adults over age 21 in cognitive control in emotionally arousing 
conditions (as teens do) but not in neutral conditions. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 110 individuals from a larger sample of 147 healthy, right-
handed 13- to 25-year-olds who underwent functional MRI (fMRI) while 
performing an adapted emotional go/no-go task (Hare et al., 2008) under 
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sustained emotional states of threat and excitement and under nonemotional 
states (Cohen et al., in press). Data from 5 participants were excluded 
because of their poor overall performance (> 2 SD below the group’s average 
performance as measured by d). Data from 14 participants were excluded 
because of excessive head motion (more than 10% of time points within a run 
censored because of translational motion > 1.56 mm, or half a voxel, or 
rotational motion > 1), and data from 18 participants were excluded because 
of technical problems that led to errors in coding and recording of behavioral 
data in the scanner. A total of 110 usable scans were included in the final 
analyses reported here (41 teens—23 females and 18 males, ages 13–17 
years, M = 16.19, SD = 1.20; 35 young adults—17 females and 18 males, 
ages 18–21 years, M = 19.88, SD = 1.09; 34 adults—17 females and 17 
males, ages 22–25 years, M = 24.08, SD = 1.04). Portions of the data from 38 
adults in this sample are included in a separate report (Cohen et al., in press) 
focusing on different experimental questions. 
 
Participants were a diverse community sample recruited from New York City 
and Los Angeles as part of an ongoing multisite project. They self-identified as 
Caucasian (32.7%), African American (27.3%), Hispanic (24.6%), Asian 
(12.7%) and “other” (2.7%). The recruitment target for this portion of the study 
was 125 participants, in anticipation of 20% attrition due to excessive head 
motion, poor performance, or technical issues. Because of exclusions due to 
poor task performance and technical issues in the scanner environment, 22 
additional participants were run. Participants reported no use of psychotropic 
medications or past diagnoses of or treatment for psychiatric or neurological 
disorders. Adults and parents provided informed written consent, and minors 
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provided assent. The institutional review board at each site approved the 
study. 
 
Experimental task 
Participants completed a modified emotional go/no-go paradigm (Hare et al., 
2008) called the Cognitive Control Under Emotion (CCUE) task (Cohen et al., 
in press). In this task, happy, fearful, and calm emotional expressions (Fig. 1a) 
are presented as targets, which participants are instructed to respond to (go 
trials), and nontargets, which participants are instructed not to respond to (no-
go trials). The task is performed in blocks of sustained anticipation of a 
negative event (aversive sound), a positive event (winning up to $100), and no 
event; each type of block is denoted with a different background color on the 
Figure 3.1: The Cognitive Control Under Emotion (CCUE) paradigm (from 
Cohen et al., in press): (a) examples of the fearful, happy, and calm faces 
used as cues and (b) schematic of one run of the task. In a given run, 
participants were instructed to respond to one type of cue (go trials) and not 
to respond to another (no-go trials). These cues were presented within 
blocks of sustained negative emotion (anticipation of an unpredictable 
aversive noise), positive emotion (anticipation of an unpredictable monetary 
reward), and neutral emotion (no event anticipated); the block type was 
indicated by the background color of the screen (yellow, blue, or purple).  
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screen (Fig. 1b). (Further descriptions of this task and task-related neural 
activations are available in other reports: Cohen et al., in press; Dreyfuss et 
al., 2014; Hare et al., 2008; Somerville et al., 2011). Participants practiced the 
task prior to entering the scanner, so that they understood the instructions and 
conditions. 
 
We included both blocks with a sustained state of threat and blocks with a 
sustained state of excitement in order to dissociate effects of arousal and 
effects of valence. Threat was induced by telling participants that they might 
experience an unpredictable aversive auditory stimulus. Excitement was 
induced by telling participants that they had a chance of winning up to $100. 
Participants were instructed that the probability of an event occurring, the 
volume of the noise, and the amount of money won would not be tied to their 
performance, but rather would be determined by the computer. They were also 
told that events of a given type would occur randomly, only when the 
background screen was a particular color (blue for one event and purple for 
the other). In reality, each participant heard the noise once and won $20 once 
over the course of the task, and these events occurred in a pseudorandomized 
order. Each event always occurred near the end of an experimental run, so 
that these time points could be eliminated from the analyses. During blocks of 
a sustained neutral state (depicted with a yellow background), participants 
were told there was no chance of either event occurring as they performed the 
task. Each state (75-s duration) was induced twice during each run. 
 
Data were acquired in six 8-min 2-s runs (total of 48 min 12 s). Each run 
consisted of a unique combination of the emotional expressions that served as 
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go and no-go cues (calm–go/fearful–no go, calm–go/happy–no go, happy–
go/fearful–no go, happy–go/calm–no go, fearful–go/calm–no go, fearful–
go/happy–no go), in a mixed-block event-related design. Run orders were 
pseudocounterbalanced, and pairing of the background color and emotional 
state was counterbalanced. Before each run, participants were told which type 
of emotional expression was the target and reminded of the meaning of each 
colored background. We then asked participants a series of four questions to 
be sure they were aware of each of these contingencies. On each trial, a face 
appeared for 500 ms; the intertrial interval was jittered (2–7 s). A total of 114 
trials were presented in each run, in a pseudorandomized order (84 go trials 
and 30 no-go trials). For each emotional state, we acquired data on a total of 
168 go trials and 60 no-go trials. 
 
Behavioral and psychophysiological data acquisition 
Participants completed a final screening for MRI safety before being 
positioned in the scanner, with a five-button (New York) or four-button (Los 
Angeles) MR-compatible button box. The experimental task was presented 
using E-Prime 1.0 (New York) or 2.0 (Los Angeles; Psychology Software 
Tools, Inc., http://www.pstnet.com) and was projected onto a flat screen 
mounted in the scanner bore. Participants viewed the screen via a mirror 
mounted on a 12-channel head coil. Skin conductance response (SCR) was 
acquired using disposable, isotonic gel electrodes, which were attached to the 
first and second fingers of the left hand between the first and second 
phalanges. The electrode cables were grounded through a radio-frequency 
filter panel. During fMRI scanning, the skin conductance signal was recorded 
(200-Hz sampling) and amplified using a Biopac recording system and 
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AcqKnowledge 4.0 software. E-prime software was used to indicate the onset 
and offset of the emotional states during the task. SCR data were acquired 
from all the participants.  
 
After exiting the scanner, participants were asked debriefing questions about 
the believability of task conditions. Specifically, they were asked how much 
they expected to win money or hear the noise during the blocks in which the 
background color signaled the possibility of those events (e.g., “Did you expect 
to win money more during the purple blocks than the blue or yellow blocks?”). 
Each question was answered using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 7 = 
very much). Collection of debriefing data from 2 of the 110 subjects was 
accidently omitted. 
 
fMRI data acquisition 
Whole-brain fMRI data were acquired using Siemens Magnetom Trio 3.0-T 
scanners located at the Citigroup Biomedical Imaging Center at Weill Cornell 
Medical College or at the Staglin Center for Cognitive Neuroscience at the 
University of California, Los Angeles. Scanning parameters were identical at 
the two data-collection sites. A high-resolution, T1-weighted magnetization-
prepared rapid-acquisition gradient-echo (MPRAGE) sequence scan was 
acquired using Biomedical Informatics Research Network (Jovicich et al., 
2006) optimized sequences with the following parameters: repetition time (TR) 
= 2,170 ms, echo time (TE) = 4.33 ms, 256-mm field of view (FOV), 160 
sagittal slices with a thickness of 1.2 mm. Functional images were acquired 
using T2*-sensitive echo planar pulse sequences covering the full brain. 
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Thirty-eight 4-mm-thick axial slices were acquired per 2,500-ms TR (TE = 30 
ms, FOV = 200 mm, flip angle = 90, 3.1-  3.1-  4.0-mm voxels). 
 
Behavioral data analysis 
Behavioral data were analyzed for accuracy using the sensitivity index d, 
which incorporates the rates of both hits and false alarms (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2004). We calculated d by subtracting the normalized false alarm 
rate from normalized accuracy on go trials. Behavioral data, stimulus timing, 
and emotional-state timing were extracted and calculated using MATLAB and 
Statistics Toolbox Release 2013b (The MathWorks, Natick, MA). All statistical 
analyses of the behavioral data were conducted using R (Release 3.1.0; R 
Core Team, 2014). We tested for age-related differences in performance (d) 
using analysis of variance (ANOVA) models that included sex and scanning 
site as between-subjects variables. To investigate performance responding to 
the emotional cues, without effects of emotional state, we tested for main 
effects of age group on performance with each cue type in the neutral state. 
To investigate performance during the emotional states, controlling for effects 
of the emotional cues, we tested for main effects of age group on performance 
responding to the calm face cues in each emotional state. A Bonferroni-
adjusted alpha of less than .01 was used to correct for multiple comparisons in 
determining the statistical significance of these ANOVA results. Bonferroni-
corrected post hoc t tests were used to determine the statistical significance of 
differences between age groups. Linear and quadratic models were also fitted 
to each dependent variable, with age modeled continuously. As in the age-
group analyses, we used a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha of less than .01 to 
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determine statistical significance. All analyses were performed on the data 
from the 110 subjects with usable imaging and behavioral data. 
 
We examined responses to the debriefing questions and the SCR data to 
assess the efficacy of our emotional-state manipulation. A 1-Hz filter was 
applied to the raw SCR data. Data were smoothed for each subject. Six 
subjects had no SCR data because of technical difficulties in the collection of 
these data, and 29 of the remaining 104 participants had no discernible 
variation in SCR across the experiment or individual runs and so were 
removed from the SCR analyses. SCR slope was extracted for each 
emotional-state block within each run and was z-scored within subjects to 
account for individual differences in SCR. Each individual’s average slope was 
calculated for each emotional state (excitement, threat, and neutral). Change 
in skin conductance was computed as the difference between average SCR 
slope in an aroused state (excitement or threat) and average SCR slope in the 
neutral state. Given the directionality of our hypotheses with respect to these 
validation measures, we performed one-tailed one-sample Student’s t tests to 
test whether responses to debriefing questions were significantly different from 
1 (the lowest value on the 7-point scale) and whether SCR differences were 
significantly different from zero. 
 
fMRI data analysis 
Image processing. Functional imaging data were preprocessed and analyzed 
using Analysis of Functional NeuroImages (AFNI) software (Cox, 1996). 
Preprocessing of functional scans included correction for slice-time acquisition 
using sinc interpolation, volume registration using a 6-parameter rigid-body 
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transformation to account for head motion, and normalization to the Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) 152 1-mm T1 template using a 12-parameter 
affine transformation and nonlinear transformations (AFNI 3dQWarp function). 
Data were resampled to 3-mm isotropic voxels and were smoothed using a 
full-width/ half-maximum Gaussian kernel of 6 mm. Signal intensity of each 
voxel time series was normalized to percentage signal change.  
 
Image analysis. A general linear model (GLM) was created for each participant 
to estimate activation in response to the emotional cues and sustained-
emotional-state blocks. To disentangle the neural responses to the cues and 
to the sustained states, which were presented simultaneously, we included 16 
regressors in each participant’s GLM: 6 task regressors for correct responses 
to the emotional cues (fearful, happy, or calm faces on go trials and fearful, 
happy, or calm faces on no-go trials), 3 task regressors modeling the longer 
(30-TR) sustained emotional states (i.e., the threat, excitement, and neutral 
sustained states), an additional regressor corresponding to trials with incorrect 
responses (both go and no-go trials), and 6 motion estimation parameters. 
Baseline trends were estimated to capture shifts in signal change. Activation in 
response to the face cues was modeled with a three-parameter gamma 
hemodynamic-response function (HRF); activation during the sustained states 
was modeled using a single-parameter block HRF. Time points with motion 
greater than half a voxel (1.56 mm) were censored, along with the preceding 
and following time points. 
 
Individual-level regression coefficients for the 110 participants were submitted 
to group linear mixed-effects (LME) analyses using the AFNI 3dLME function 
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(Chen, Saad, Britton, Pine, & Cox, 2013), which is robust to small amounts of 
missing data. All group-level analyses included a random intercept for each 
participant and included sex and scanning site as between-subjects variables. 
Separate models were used to assess effects of transient cues (modeled as 
brief events) and sustained states (modeled as prolonged blocks) on brain 
activity. The first group-level LME model assessed effects of the transient cues 
(fearful, happy, and calm faces) on go and no-go trials. The second group-
level LME model assessed effects of the sustained states (threat, excitement, 
and neutral). Age-group contrasts (general linear tests) were specified within 
each model to directly probe the neural correlates of behavioral findings. Two 
additional models assessed effects of the emotional cues and emotional states 
as a function of exact age as a continuous variable (i.e., interactions of 
emotional cues or states with exact age). 
 
In group whole-brain analyses, individual voxels were thresholded at a p value 
of .005; the cluster-size threshold was a p value of .05 after correction for 
multiple comparisons (performed using Monte Carlo simulation via the 
3dClustSim program in AFNI). For the threat condition, given our a priori 
hypotheses regarding differences in prefrontal activation, we used an 
anatomical region of interest (ROI) for the PFC (obtained from the Harvard-
Oxford probabilistic atlas in FSL; http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/; Smith et 
al., 2004). Similar to the PFC ROI in previous studies (e.g., Foerde, 
Steinglass, Shohamy, & Walsh, 2015), this ROI combined the frontal pole, 
superior frontal gyrus, middle frontal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus (triangularis 
and opercularis), frontal medial cortex, subcallosal cortex, paracingulate gyrus, 
cingulate gyrus anterior division, and frontal orbital cortex bilaterally; a 
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threshold of 50% probability was used for all subregions within the PFC. A p 
value of .005 was used as the threshold for individual voxels (p < .05 after 
PFC volume correction for multiple comparisons was performed using Monte 
Carlo simulation via the 3dClustSim program in AFNI). Regression coefficients 
for individual participants were extracted from regions with significant effects 
and were tested for brain-behavior correlations in R (Release 3.1.0; R Core 
Team, 2014). 
 
Psychophysiological interaction analysis. Generalized psychophysiological 
interaction (gPPI) analyses (McLaren, Ries, Xu, & Johnson, 2012) were 
conducted in AFNI to examine task-dependent connectivity across the whole 
brain. Seed regions were the two PFC regions identified as having age-group 
effects. The gPPI analyses were carried out by removing sources of noise and 
artifact, deconvolving the neural signal, extracting the functional time course 
within the seed regions (5-mm spheres around peak activation), and 
convolving the time-course data with task timings and the canonical HRF 
(McLaren et al., 2012). The 16-regressor GLM used for the individual-level 
image analyses was implemented, but for the gPPI analyses, these models 
also included regressors for the seed time course and each Time Course  
Task Condition interaction, for a total of 27 regressors. The group-level LME 
model (controlling for sex and scanning site) was used to test the specific age-
group contrasts. Specifically, group-level LME models tested the effects of 
transient cues (fearful, happy, and calm faces) and sustained states (threat, 
excitement, and neutral) separately. Age-group contrasts (general linear tests) 
were specified within each model. The models used a p threshold of .05, 
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corrected for multiple comparisons at the whole-brain level using 3dClustSim, 
as described previously. 
 
Results 
Behavioral results 
Validation of the paradigm. Responses to the debriefing questions and SCR 
slope differences were tested independently, so we used a Bonferroni-
adjusted alpha of less than .025 in our validation tests. These validation 
measures were collapsed across age. Participants expected both the money, 
t(107) = 24.49, p < .001, d = 3.35, and loud noise, t(107) = 31.87, p < .001, d = 
4.36, to occur during the blocks in which they were led to anticipate these 
possibilities (Fig. 2a). 
Figure 3.2. Validation of the Cognitive Control Under Emotion (CCUE) 
paradigm: (a) participants’ mean ratings of how likely they thought they 
were to win money and hear a loud sound in the excitement and threat 
blocks, respectively, and (b) participants’ mean skin conductance response 
(SCR) during those blocks relative to the neutral blocks. Error bars 
represent 1 SE. 
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Participants’ mean SCR difference scores (arousal state minus neutral state) 
were positive for both the excitement condition, t(74) = 1.92, p = .029, d = 
0.32, and the threat condition, t(74) = 1.65, p = .051, d = 0.27 (Fig. 2b). SCR 
difference scores for the excitement and threat conditions were not 
significantly different from each other, t(74) = 0.26, p > .250, d = 0.04. These 
validation results replicate previous results for adults performing this same 
task (Cohen et al., in press). 
 
Main effects of age for each type of emotional cue. In the neutral-state blocks, 
there were significant main effects of age group on performance in response 
to fearful cues, F(2, 98) = 11.11, p < .001, p2 = .16; happy cues, F(2, 98) = 
10.90, p < .001, p2 = .15; and calm cues, F(2, 98) = 7.81, p < .001, p2 = .10 
(see Fig. 3a and Behavioral Results and Figs. S1a and S2a in the 
Supplemental Material available online). Post hoc t tests revealed that teens 
and young adults showed diminished performance relative to adults in 
response to fearful cues—teens versus adults: t(62.39) = 4.08, p < .001, d = 
0.95; young adults versus adults: t(64.82) = 3.33, p = .0019, d = 0.80; teens 
versus young adults: t(70.09) = 0.61, p > .250, d = 0.14. However, young 
adults and adults showed enhanced performance relative to teens in response 
to happy cues—teens versus adults: t(71.15) = 4.14, p < .001, d = 0.96; young 
adults versus adults: t(65.77) = 1.79, p > .250, d = 0.43; teens versus young 
adults: t(73.96) = 2.55, p = .042, d = 0.59—and only teens and adults differed 
significantly in their performance with calm cues—teens versus adults: t(64.05) 
= 3.54, p = .001, d = 0.82; young adults versus adults: t(64.60) = 1.56, p > 
.250, d = 0.38; teens versus young adults: t(71.54) = 2.14, p = .140, d = 0.49. 
71 
 
We also examined effects of age as a continuous variable, fitting both linear 
and quadratic functions to performance with each cue type in the neutral-state 
blocks. Linear and quadratic functions significantly fit the data for all three cue 
types—fearful cues, linear: adjusted R2 = .12, p < .001, F(1, 108) = 15.68; 
fearful cues, quadratic: adjusted R2 = .13, p < .001, F(2, 107) = 9.23; happy  
Figure 3.3: Results for the fearful cues. The graph in (a) shows mean 
performance in response to the brief fearful cues in the neutral-state 
condition, as indexed by d, for each of the age groups. The brain image 
in (b) shows the location of the region in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(dlPFC) for which signal-change results are presented. The graphs in (c) 
and (d) show mean signal change in the dlPFC in response to the fearful 
cues for each age group and as a function of d in the neutral-state 
condition (separately for each age group), respectively. The brain image 
in (e) shows the location of the regions in the dorsal anterior cingulate 
cortex (dACC) and parietal cortex for which mean signal change in 
response to the fearful cues is graphed as a function of d in the neutral-
state condition, separately for each age group, in (f) and (g). Error bars 
represent 1 SE. Asterisks indicate significant differences (**p < .01, ***p 
<.001). 
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cues, linear: adjusted R2 = .14, p < .001, F(1, 108) = 18.33; happy cues, 
quadratic: adjusted R2 = .13, p < .001, F(2, 107) = 9.25; calm cues, linear: 
adjusted R2 = .10, p < .001, F(1, 108) = 13.6; calm cues, quadratic: adjusted 
R2 = .095, p = .002, F(2, 107) = 6.75. However, the fit of the quadratic function 
completely overlapped with the fit of the linear function for the calm cues  
 
(see Fig. 4 for performance in response to calm cues in all three sustained 
emotional states and in response to fearful and happy cues in the neutral-state 
blocks). 
 
Figure 3.4: Scatterplots showing male and female participants’ 
performance, as indexed by d, as a function of age, along with linear and 
quadratic functions fitted to the data. Results are shown for each kind of 
emotional cue in the neutral-state condition, as well as for calm cues in the 
threat and excitement conditions. 
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Main effects of age for each emotional state. There were significant main 
effects of age group on performance in response to calm cues when 
participants were in emotionally arousing states of threat, F(2, 98) = 17.57, p < 
.001, p2 = .24 (Fig. 5a), and of excitement, F(2, 98) = 8.65, p < .001, p2 = .13 
(Fig. S1b). Post hoc t tests revealed that, although young adults performed 
better than teens, teens and young adults both showed diminished 
performance relative to adults under the state of threat—teens versus adults: 
t(60.47) = 5.40, p < .001, d = 1.24; young adults versus adults: t(59.51) = 2.75, 
p = .014, d = 0.66; teens versus young adults: t(73.25) = 3.25, p = .014, d = 
0.64. In contrast, only teens and adults’ performance differed significantly 
under the state of excitement—teens versus adults: t(58.52) = 4.28, p < .001, 
d = 0.98; young adults versus adults: t(66.95) = 2.03, p = .087, d = 0.49; teens 
versus young adults: t(61.39) = 1.83, p = .213, d = 0.42. 
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We also examined effects of age as a continuous variable, fitting both linear 
and quadratic functions to performance in response to the calm cues in each 
emotional-state condition. We found that both linear and quadratic functions 
significantly fit the data in both the threat condition—linear function: adjusted 
R2 = .23, p < .001, F(1, 108) = 34.08; quadratic function: adjusted R2 = .24, p < 
.001, F(2, 107) = 17.78—and the excitement condition—linear function: 
Figure 3.5: Results for the sustained-threat condition. The graph in (a) 
shows mean performance on calm-cue trials, as indexed by d, for each of 
the age groups under the sustained state of threat. The brain image in (b) 
shows the location of the region in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) 
for which signal-change results are presented. The graphs in (c) and (d) 
show mean signal change in the vmPFC in the threat condition for each 
age group and as a function of d on calm-cue trials (separately for each 
age group), respectively. The brain images show the location of the regions 
in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and posterior parietal cortex 
(PPC) for which functional coupling with the vmPFC is graphed for the 
three age groups in (e) and (f), respectively. Error bars represent 1 SE. 
The asterisk indicates a significant difference (*p < .05, ***p <.001). 
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adjusted R2 = .13, p < .001, F(1, 108) = 17.09; quadratic function: adjusted R2 
= .13, p < .001, F(2, 107) = 9.21 (see Fig. 4). 
 
Imaging results 
To probe the neural correlates of the observed behavioral effects, we 
examined blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) activity in the age-group 
contrasts specified in the group LME models for each emotional cue and state. 
Specifically, general linear tests comparing brain activity (relative to implicit 
baseline, i.e., overall baseline brain activity) of teens and young adults with 
that of adults were specified for the relevant conditions. We also examined 
BOLD activity using group LME models in which age was modeled 
continuously. For these models, in the absence of any specific general linear 
tests, we examined activation maps showing the interactions of age with type 
of emotional cue and emotional-state condition. 
 
Effects of emotional cues as a function of age. Two clusters survived whole-
brain correction in the age-group analyses of response to fearful cues, 
showing less activity in teens and young adults than in adults: right dlPFC (x = 
41.5, y = 9.5, z = 36.5, 47 voxels; Z = 4.66, p < .02, corrected; Figs. 3b and 
3c) and right thalamus (x = 20.5, y = 23.5, z = 6.5, 57 voxels; Z = 3.88, p < 
.02, corrected). MR signal change in dlPFC was positively correlated with 
behavioral performance (in the neutral condition) responding to fearful cues 
across age, r(108) = .203, p = .033 (Fig. 3d), but this correlation did not remain 
significant when we controlled for age, r(107) = .087, p = .365. A general linear 
test corresponding to the behavioral result was performed for happy cues in 
the group-level emotional-cue model to compare brain activity (relative to 
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implicit baseline) of teens with that of adults and young adults in response to 
happy cues. A single cluster in the right inferior frontal gyrus (x = –32.5, y = –
24.5, z = –11.5, 30 voxels; Z = –4.18, p < .02, corrected) survived whole-brain 
correction, showing more activity in teens than in both young adults and adults 
(see Imaging Results Figs. S2b and S2c in the Supplemental Material). No 
clusters survived whole-brain correction in the analyses of activation in 
response to calm cues, and no interactions of emotional cue with age group 
were observed. 
 
Four clusters in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), parietal cortex, 
and right and left cerebellum survived whole-brain correction when we 
examined the interaction of age as a continuous variable with type of 
emotional cue (see Table S1 in the Supplemental Material). In the two largest 
regions, the dACC and the parietal cortex (Fig. 3e), activity in response to 
fearful cues was positively correlated with age, r(108) = .196, p = .040, and 
r(108) = .32, p < .001, respectively. MR signal change in response to happy 
cues was negatively correlated with age in the dACC, r(108) = .189, p = .048, 
but not in the parietal cortex, r(108) = .164, p = .087. Activity in response to 
calm cues was not significantly correlated with age in either of these regions, 
r(108) = .088, p = .363, and r(108) = .079, p = .412, respectively. 
We examined whether changes in dACC and parietal activity in response to 
fearful cues were correlated with behavioral performance. In both of these 
regions, MR signal change in response to fearful cues was positively 
correlated with d in the neutral-state condition, r(108) = .222, p = .020, and 
r(108) = .359, p < .001, respectively (Figs. 3f and 3g). Similar patterns were 
observed even when we controlled for age, r(107) = .166, p = .081, and r(107) 
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= .277, p = .002. These results suggest that these regions are important for 
behavioral performance of the task. 
 
Effects of emotional states as a function of age. Although no activations 
survived whole-brain correction for the contrast of age groups in emotional 
states, a single cluster in the ventromedial PFC (vmPFC; x = 3.5, y = 33.5, z 
= 17.5, 13 voxels; Z = 3.58, p < .05, PFC corrected; Fig. 5b) survived PFC 
volume correction for responses in the state of threat. Teens’ and young 
adults’ BOLD activity in the vmPFC during the threat condition showed a 
sustained increase relative to adults’ (Fig. 5c). MR signal change in this region 
in the threat condition was negatively correlated with behavioral performance 
(in response to the calm cues) in the threat condition, r(108) = .308, p = .001 
(Fig. 5d), and this correlation remained significant even when we controlled for 
age, r(107) = .215, p = .023, and when we removed the one extreme outlier, 
r(107) = .253, p = .008. No interactions of emotional state with age group 
were observed. In analyses for the excitement and neutral-state conditions, no 
clusters survived whole-brain or PFC volume correction. 
 
A single cluster in the parietal cortex (x = 2.5, y = 68.5, z = 54.5, 29 voxels; F 
= 11.90, p < .05, corrected) survived whole-brain correction when we 
examined the interaction of emotional state and age as a continuous variable 
(see Fig. S3 in the Supplemental Material). MR signal change in this region 
showed similar positive associations with age in the threat and excitement 
conditions, r(108) = .181, p = .058, and r(108) = .305, p = .001, respectively, 
but not in the neutral-state condition, r(108) = .151, p = .116. Because BOLD 
activity in the threat and excitement conditions showed positive correlations 
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with age, we collapsed the MR signal across these conditions and tested for 
associations between activation in this region and behavioral performance (in 
response to the calm cues) in these conditions. MR signal change was 
positively correlated with behavioral performance, r(108) = .209, p = .028 (see 
Fig. S3), but this correlation did not hold when we controlled for age, r(107) = 
.11, p = .251. 
 
Seed-based functional connectivity with prefrontal regions in the three age 
groups. Whole-brain gPPI analyses were performed using the dlPFC and 
vmPFC regions as seeds. Nine clusters of voxels showing significantly less 
functional coupling with the vmPFC in teens and young adults than in adults 
across the threat condition were observed (see Table S2 in the Supplemental 
Material). Areas showing this pattern included the dACC (Fig. 5e) and 
posterior parietal cortex (Fig. 5f). No significant clusters were observed in the 
age-group contrast for fearful cues using the dlPFC seed. 
 
Discussion 
 
Our findings suggest a developmental shift in cognitive control in negative 
emotional situations during young adulthood that is paralleled by dynamic 
developmental changes in prefrontal circuitry. Specifically, young adults 
showed diminished cognitive control under both brief and prolonged negative 
emotional arousal relative to slightly older adults, a pattern not observed in 
neutral or positive situations. This behavioral pattern was paralleled by altered 
recruitment of lateral and medial prefrontal circuitry in young adults and 
adolescents, a finding consistent with structural imaging studies showing 
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protracted development of prefrontal circuitry (Gogtay et al., 2004; Sowell et 
al., 2004). 
 
Teens’ and young adults’ diminished cognitive control in response to negative 
cues was paralleled by their decreased activity in cognitive-control circuitry. 
When presented with fearful cues, teens and young adults showed less 
activity than older adults in dlPFC, a region implicated in affective and 
cognitive regulation (Silvers et al., 2015; Vincent et al., 2008), and in the dACC 
and parietal cortex. The dlPFC and parietal cortex have reciprocal projections 
with the dACC, and all three regions have been implicated in cognitive control 
and are coactivated during cognitive-control tasks (Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, 
Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Platt & Glimcher, 1999; Roy, Shohamy, & Wager, 
2012). Further, activity in these regions not only was consistently lower in 
younger participants, but also was positively correlated with task performance. 
Together, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that lower levels of 
activity within this circuitry in younger individuals reflects diminished cognitive 
control in the face of negative emotional cues that signal potential threat in the 
environment. 
 
Although under sustained states of negative emotional arousal (threat) young 
adults performed better than teens they performed worse than adults. Teens’ 
and young adults’ diminished performance relative to adults in the threat 
condition was paralleled by increased activity in the vmPFC. This region has 
been implicated in various processes, including self-referential thought and 
integration of affective information, and is a proposed hub for affective 
computations and regulation (Roy et al., 2012). Increased sustained 
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recruitment of the vmPFC under threat in teens and young adults may suggest 
heightened sensitivity to potential threat, leading to emotional interference and 
diminished cognitive control. This interpretation is supported in part by our 
finding of decreased functional coupling of the vmPFC with cognitive-control 
circuitry of the dACC and posterior parietal cortex in the threat condition 
among teens and young adults relative to adults. The negative functional 
connectivity between cognitive and emotional brain regions during this 
emotional state may underlie the poorer performance of the younger age 
groups.  
 
Taken together, these findings suggest that young adulthood is a time when 
cognitive control is still vulnerable to negative emotional influences, in part as 
a result of continued development of lateral and medial prefrontal circuitry. 
This temporal developmental shift in cognitive-control capacity in negatively 
arousing situations relative to neutral (or positive) situations is consistent with 
the classic notion of developmental cascades in brain and behavior (Casey, 
Galván, & Somerville, 2015; Masten & Cicchetti, 2010). Accordingly, dynamic 
brain changes during late adolescence may enhance receptivity to or 
processing of emotional inputs in order to facilitate meeting changing 
socioemotional pressures that accompany adulthood (Casey et al., 2015). 
 
Our findings have potential implications for informing age-related legal and 
social policies. Developmental findings based largely on teens have been 
referenced in several U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding treatment of 
juvenile offenders over the past decade, with the Court acknowledging 
immature cognitive functioning in juveniles as a mitigating factor in judgments 
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of criminal culpability (Cohen & Casey, 2014; Scott, 2013; Steinberg, 2013). 
Scientific research has demonstrated that adolescents show heightened 
sensitivity to motivational and socioemotional information, which potentially 
renders them more vulnerable to poor decision making in these situations, 
compared with younger and older individuals (Chein et al., 2011; Cohen-
Gilbert & Thomas, 2013; Dreyfuss et al., 2014; Galvan et al., 2006; Grose-
Fifer et al., 2013; Hare et al., 2008; Somerville et al., 2011; Steinberg et al., 
2009). The extension of this work to young adults, who show diminished 
cognitive control relative to slightly older adults in negative emotional 
situations, may have implications for legal policy. This is not to suggest that 
teens and young adults should not be held accountable for their actions, but 
rather, the boundaries of juvenile-court jurisdiction, criminal-court sentencing, 
and punishment may be informed by developmental considerations (Bonnie & 
Scott, 2013). 
 
The implications of our findings must be considered within the limitations of the 
study. First, behaviors were measured within a controlled research setting. 
Although the emotionally arousing conditions may be relevant to emotional 
arousal in the real world, they were limited to experimentally manipulated 
emotional conditions that did not capture the complex real-world situations in 
which individuals typically make decisions. Second, the sample, although 
community based and representative of the racial and ethnic distribution in Los 
Angeles and New York City, was relatively small, with 110 participants 13 to 
25 years of age; replication of these findings is warranted.  
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Prior research examining motivational and social influences on cognitive 
capacities in young adults as a unique age group has produced mixed results 
(Chein et al., 2011; Cohen-Gilbert et al., 2014; Silva et al., 2015; Steinberg et 
al., 2009). The present and previous findings suggest that teens’ and young 
adults’ cognitive capacities may be affected differently by various situations. 
For instance, although negative emotional arousal may diminish cognitive 
control in both teens and young adults, positive emotional arousal and the 
presence of peers may not influence young adults as strongly as teens (Chein 
et al., 2011). Identifying specific situations in which the behavior of young 
adults may differ from that of slightly older adults will be important in informing 
potential changes to existing policies and laws. Moreover, further examination 
of changes in brain structure, activity, and connectivity during this 
developmental period may provide clearer insights into why and when 
researchers may or may not observe group-level behavioral changes in young 
adults. 
 
We examined the influence of emotional arousal on cognitive control from 
early adolescence through the mid 20s and found that negative emotional 
arousal, brief or prolonged, affects this capacity in individuals ages 18 to 21 
more than in older individuals. Few studies have examined cognitive 
capacities under emotional influences, and fewer still have taken this approach 
to study developmental differences in capacities of potential relevance to legal 
and social policies. Our findings provide support for consideration of 
contextual influences on behavior and brain function, such as the influence of 
emotional arousal, when evaluating appropriate age cutoffs for such policies. 
Although the data in this study do not speak directly to these policy issues, 
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they may inform dialogues about the age of adulthood in a variety of social 
and policy contexts. 
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Chapter 4:  
The impact of emotional cues on memory processes across adolescence 
 
Emotional information can alter actions and choices in the present and thus 
may also be able to impact subsequent behavior by influencing memory. 
Adolescence is a time of heightened sensitivity to emotional and social inputs, 
as dynamic changes in brain structure and function take place. In adults, 
emotional information has been shown to influence subsequent memory, for 
better and for worse; however, the impact of emotional and social content on 
memory across development, as neural circuitries continue to mature, remains 
unclear. The present study implements an emotional n-back task using happy, 
fearful, and calm faces as well as places and a surprise memory test to 
characterize age-related trajectories of recognition memory in individuals ages 
9 to 29. Participants were tested for their recognition memory of the stimuli 
used in the task either immediately after completion or 24 hours later, to allow 
for memory consolidation. Consistent with previous work, we found that 
improvements in working memory increased linearly across development. A 
cubic age pattern best fit immediate recognition memory accuracy, with peak 
memory for places occurring during adolescence and steady improvements in 
memory for fearful faces with age. There was no effect of age at 24 hours, 
however memory accuracy was enhanced for fearful faces relative to other 
emotions or places across age. These preliminary results suggest that the 
temporal dynamics of memory for emotional and non-emotional stimuli may be 
changing across development, which may have implications for behaviors in 
the short and long-term. 
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Introduction 
 
Adolescence is often thought of as a rollercoaster ride of emotions and 
impulsive actions. During this transitional period of development, adolescents 
navigate many novel experiences and dynamic environments (Spear, 2000; 
Casey, 2015) alongside widespread structural and functional changes in 
neural circuitry (Sowell et al., 1999; Gogtay et al., 2004; Raznahan et al., 
2014; Simmonds et al., 2014; Mills et al., 2016). A large body of evidence from 
developmental research has demonstrated that adolescents show a 
heightened sensitivity to both positive and negative emotional and social 
information (Galvan et al., 2006; Hare et al., 2008; Steinberg et al., 2009; 
Chein et al., 2010; Geier et al., 2010; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010; Somerville 
et al., 2011; Cohen-Gilbert & Thomas, 2013; Grose-Fifer et al., 2013; Dreyfuss 
et al., 2014) that often motivates them towards action (Casey, 2015). Given 
the observed increased reactivity towards socioemotional information during 
this stage of development, how might emotions influence memory for specific 
events? 
 
Emotions have been shown to influence episodic memory, for better and for 
worse, in adults (Gagnon & Wagner, 2016; Kensinger, 2004; LaBar & Cabeza, 
2006; McGaugh, 2004; Phelps, 2006; Yonelinas & Ritchey, 2015). Emotional 
stimuli, particularly negative stimuli such as negative scenes, stories, and 
words or neutral stimuli paired with an aversive stimulus such as a loud noise 
or a shock, are better remembered than neutral stimuli (Hamann, 2001; LaBar 
& Cabeza, 2006; McGaugh, 2004; Phelps, 2006). These effects typically 
emerge after a delay of several hours and are often smaller or sometimes 
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absent when memory is tested immediately (Andersen et al., 2006; Sharot & 
Phelps, 2004; Sharot & Yonelinas, 2008; Sharot et al., 2007). The emotional 
memory enhancement effect appears to be specific to the emotional item or 
object (Kensinger, 2007; Mather, 2007), as contextual details surrounding an 
emotional event do not show a recollection boost (Sharot & Yonelinas, 2008; 
Mather & Knight, 2008; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006). In contrast, flashbulb 
memories and the accompanying surrounding events are rapidly forgotten and 
inconsistently remembered in the long-term, although confidence in memory 
remains high (Hirst et al., 2009; 2015; Hirst & Phelps, 2016). Stress also often 
impairs retrieval of both emotional and neutral information (Domes et al., 2004; 
Kuhlmann et al., 2005; Schwabe et al., 2012) and, similarly to emotional 
memory enhancement effects, these effects also seem to emerge over time 
(Schwabe & Wolf, 2014). Thus, the nature of the effects of emotion on 
memory—i.e. whether memory is enhanced, unaffected, or diminished—varies 
depending on the type of emotion, the form of recollection that is assessed, 
and the amount of time that has elapsed between the event and when memory 
is assessed. 
 
Early evidence of developmental changes in memory processes come from 
the studies of “infantile amnesia,” or the inability to retrieve episodic memories 
from early in development. This phenomenon has been observed across 
species and specifically influences memories from before the ages of 
approximately two to four years in humans (Rubin, 2000; Hayne & Jack, 2011; 
Li et al., 2014). There is also evidence of adolescent specific differences in 
memory. Research in humans shows evidence of a reminiscence bump, such 
that people tend to show better recollection for autobiographical memories 
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(Rubin et al.,1998) and popular culture-related memories (Janssen et al., 
2012) from adolescence and young adulthood, relative to other periods of life. 
Studies of fear learning and extinction, primarily carried out in rodents, also 
reveal adolescent specific memory effects, showing persistent fear memories 
in adolescents relative to younger and older ages (Kim et al., 2011; Pattwell et 
al., 2012; Baker et al., 2016). Still, few studies have examined emotional 
episodic memory across development in humans and fewer still have focused 
on adolescence.  
 
Multiple memory systems, centered on the amygdala for emotional memory 
and the hippocampus for episodic and declarative memory, are proposed to 
interact for memory of emotional events (McDonald et al., 2004; Phelps, 
2004). An emotional binding account of episodic memory proposes that the 
amygdala binds emotional information to an item, communicating with both the 
perirhinal cortex and hippocampus, to modulate encoding, storage, and 
recollection of these memories (Yonelinas & Ritchey, 2015). In humans, the 
amygdala and hippocampus show different, dynamic trajectories of structural 
development. The amygdala shows a quadratic volumetric trajectory, with 
peak volume around age 16 (Mills et al., 2014), whereas the hippocampus 
shows volumetric increases until around ages 13-14 followed by a protracted 
course of volumetric decreases and increases in anterior and posterior 
hippocampus throughout adolescence and into adulthood (Daugherty et al., 
2016; Lee et al., 2014; Gogtay et al., 2006; Tamnes et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
both the prefrontal and parietal cortices implicated in working memory 
processes also show protracted development in young adulthood (Gogtay et 
al., 2004; Simmonds et al., 2014; Mills et al., 2016). Differences in both 
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hippocampal and prefrontal activity and connectivity in working memory tasks 
are evident throughout adolescence (Finn et al., 2010). Together, these 
studies showing that the neural circuitry underlying emotional episodic 
memory processes continues to develop into adulthood and research showing 
developmental sensitivities to emotional inputs suggest the potential for 
developmental differences in recognition memory for emotional items. 
 
Two divergent hypotheses arise from the observations of heightened 
sensitivity to emotional information during adolescence. Emotional events are 
particularly salient to adolescents, so we might hypothesize that they will have 
better memory for these events; however, considering the multitude of 
socioemotional experiences adolescents encounter on a daily basis, we might 
hypothesize that if everything is salient, the events may start to blur together 
or compete. There is evidence to suggest that emotional information, both 
emotional faces and non-face pictures, enhances memory in adolescents 
(Nelson et al., 2003; Vasa et al., 2011; Pinabiaux et al., 2013) and that recall 
for emotional pictures is comparable to that of adults (Nelson et al., 2003; 
Vasa et al., 2011). These extant studies have only examined recognition 
memory within an hour of the encoding task, binned by age groups, and only 
included child and adolescent participants (Pinabiaux et al., 2013) or 
adolescent and adult participants (Nelson et al., 2003; Vasa et al., 2011). 
 
The current study examined recognition memory for stimuli presented in an 
emotional n-back working memory task in individuals ages 9 to 29, spanning 
the transition into and out of adolescence. This working memory task consists 
of blocks with emotional (happy and fearful faces) and neutral (calm faces and 
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places) stimuli. Incorporating both neutral faces and places allows for a control 
that incorporates social information and a control without any social or 
emotional information, respectively. We administered a surprise recognition 
memory test to two groups of participants, one receiving the test immediately 
after completing the emotional n-back task and the other 24 hours later. We 
examined age continuously in order to determine distinct patterns of age-
related change by cue type. We hypothesized that adolescents would show 
similar recognition memory to adults in the immediate condition and that 
adolescent specific differences in memory for emotional cues would emerge 
after 24 hours. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
One hundred and thirty-three participants, ages 9 to 29 years, were recruited 
to participate in the study. Thirty-three participants were excluded for poor 
performance on the working memory task (< 75% accuracy in the 0-back 
condition, on which subjects should be near ceiling due to low memory load). 
Three additional subjects were excluded for not returning for their second 
appointment. Behavioral data from 97 subjects (46 males and 51 females; 
mean age = 18.49; SD = 5.92) are reported in the final analyses (Figure 4.1). 
Subjects were randomly assigned to an immediate recall condition (n = 49; 22 
males and 27 females; mean age = 18.10; SD = 5.95) or a 24-hour recall 
condition (n = 48; 24 males and 24 females; mean age = 19.62; SD = 5.85). 
Participants were recruited from a diverse community sample in the New York 
City area and self identified as Caucasian (41.2%), African American (20.6%), 
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Asian (10.3%), Hispanic (20.6%), and Other (6.2%). Participants reported no 
use of psychotropic medications or past diagnoses of, or treatment for, 
psychiatric or neurological disorders. All participants provided informed written 
consent and minors provided written assent approved by the Institutional 
Review Board at Weill Cornell Medical College. 
 
Emotional n-back behavioral paradigm 
The N-back task used in the present study (Figure 4.2) was modified from the 
Human Connectome Project N-back task (http://www.humanconnectome.org/; 
Barch et al., 2013). The N-back task had two runs consisting of eight blocks 
each. Each block consisted of 10 trials (2.5 s each) and 4 fixation blocks (15 s 
each). Each trial consisted of a stimulus presented for 2 s, followed 
Figure 4.1: Histogram representing age and sex distribution of participants. 
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immediately by a 500 ms fixation cross. Of the 10 trials in each block, 2 were 
targets, 2–3 were non-target lures (e.g., repeated stimuli in the wrong n-back 
position, either 1-back or 3-back), and the remainder were non-lures (i.e., 
stimuli only presented once). There were a total of 160 trials using 96 unique 
stimuli. 
 
Four different stimulus types (24 unique stimuli of each type) were presented 
in separate blocks in each run. On each trial, the participants were asked to 
rate the picture as a “Match” or “No Match.” Participants were told to make a 
response on every trial. In each run, four blocks were a 2-back working 
memory task—participants were instructed to respond “match” when the 
current stimulus was the same as the one shown two back— and four blocks 
were a 0-back working memory task—participants were instructed to respond 
“match” when the current stimulus was the same as the target presented at 
the start of the block. At the start of each block, a 2.5 s cue indicated the task 
type (“2-back” or “target =” and a photo of the target stimulus). In this 
emotional variant of the task, blocks of trials consisted of happy, fearful, and 
neutral facial expressions as well as places. The facial stimuli were obtained 
from the Racially Diverse Affective Expressions (RADIATE) set of stimuli 
(Conley et al., in prep) and places stimuli were obtained from previous studies 
(Kanwisher, 2001; O’Craven and Kanwisher, 2000; Park and Chun, 2009).  
 
Prior to completing the task, participants all completed a brief training and 
practice. The training described the 0-back and 2-back memory tasks and 
walked through step by step examples of how the participant should respond 
in each block, with feedback. This was immediately followed by a brief 
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simulation of the task consisting of four blocks (2 of each n-back memory task; 
2 face blocks, 2 place blocks) consisting four trials each. The stimuli used in 
the practice were different from those in the task. 
 
Recognition memory test procedures 
The surprise recognition memory test (Figure 4.2) included 96 old stimuli 
presented during the emotional n-back task and 96 new stimuli, with equal 
numbers of each stimulus type in the old and new stimulus sets (24 each of 
happy, fearful, and neutral facial expressions as well as places in each set). A 
total of 192 pictures were presented during the recognition memory test. 
Participants were asked to rate each picture as either “Old” or “New.” Each 
Figure 4.2: Experimental paradigm. Schematic of 2-back (happy face) and 0-
back (place) blocks of the emotional n-back task and examples of trials in the 
subsequent memory test.  
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picture was presented for 2 s followed immediately by a 1s presentation of a 
fixation cross. Instructions and a 2-trial practice (one “Old” from the task 
practice and one new stimulus) preceded the memory test. Participants were 
randomly assigned to an immediate recall condition or a 24-hour recall 
condition. 
 
Explicit knowledge regarding the memory test 
Prior to administering the recognition memory test (either immediately after the 
emotional n-back or 24 hours later), we assessed whether participants 
expected the surprise memory test via two questions described in a previous 
study of recognition memory (Dunsmoor et al., 2015). We first asked 
participants “Do you have any expectations of what this next task in the 
experiment will be: yes or no?” Once participants had answered this question, 
they were told that the next experiment would test their memory for the 
pictures presented in the earlier game. Participants were then asked to 
indicate “How surprised are you that there is a memory test?” on a 5-point 
scale from 1 “I did not expect a memory test at all” to 5 “Yes, I knew there 
would be a memory test.” Participants who responded “Yes” to the first 
question and “5” to the second questions were to be excluded from analyses, 
however none of the participants in the present sample met both criteria. 
 
Behavioral data analysis 
Trial by trial accuracy data from the emotional n-back and recognition memory 
test were extracted using MATLAB R2016a and analyses were conducted 
using R version 3.3.2 (R Core Team, 2016). General linear mixed effects 
models using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2014) were used to perform 
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binomial logistic regressions with random effects for participants. To determine 
patterns of age-related change, linear, quadratic, and cubic patterns were 
tested by incorporating polynomial terms of mean-centered age (using the poly 
function to compute orthogonal polynomials) and their interaction with the fixed 
effect of stimulus type (neutral, place, happy, fear) into the model. This 
allowed for assessment of differences in age-related patterns of behavioral 
change in response to fearful, happy, and place stimuli relative to neutral face 
stimuli. Neutral face stimuli were used as the baseline, as these stimuli 
allowed for control of the social information inherent to face stimuli. These 
nested models were tested for goodness of fit as compared to a model 
including only the fixed effect of stimulus type (no age terms) using a χ² test.  
 
Following the identification of the best fitting age model, covariates were then 
each added individually to the model and compared directly to the simpler 
model using a χ² test. A p-value < 0.05 on the χ² test was taken to indicate 
that the covariate explained a significant amount of variance; otherwise the 
simpler model was preferred. For models assessing emotional n-back task 
performance, fixed effects of sex and recognition memory condition (0 hr or 24 
hr) were each tested; for models assessing recognition memory for old stimuli, 
fixed effects of sex, working memory accuracy, and back condition (0-back or 
2-back) were each tested; and for models assessing recognition memory for 
new stimuli, only fixed effects of sex were tested. Full descriptions of the best 
fitting models are reported. 
 
Results 
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Emotional n-back task 
Figure 4.3: Emotional n-back task performance. A) Accuracy in the 0-back 
task increases linearly with age in response to happy and fearful faces. B) 
Accuracy in the 2-back task increases linearly with age across stimulus type, 
with diminished accuracy across age for places. Each colored dot represents 
a participant and is scaled based on number of trials. Lines of best fit shown 
with 95% confidence interval. * = p < 0.05, **= p < 0.01 
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We tested for age effects in performance of the 0-back and 2-back 
components of the task separately. The relationship between mean-centered 
age and working memory task accuracy was best described by the linear age  
model for both the 0-back (χ²(4) = 11.05, p = 0.026; Figure 4.3A) and 2-back 
(χ²(4) = 19.15, p < 0.001; Figure 4.3B) components of the task. Model fits were 
not improved by the inclusion recognition memory condition (0-back model, 
χ²(1) = 0.01, p > 0.250; 2-back model, χ²(1) = 0.12, p > 0.250) or sex (0-back 
model, χ²(1) = 0.25, p > 0.250; 2-back model, χ²(1) = 0.29, p = 0.09) as fixed 
effects, thus the simpler models were preferred. The 0-back model showed 
significant improvements in working memory accuracy with age in response to 
happy faces (β = 23.14, p = 0.008) and fearful faces (β = 15.78, p = 0.049) 
relative to neutral faces (see Table 1 for full descriptions of the model). The 2-
back model showed significantly diminished working memory accuracy across 
age in response to places (β = -13.66, p = 0.03) relative to neutral faces and a 
main effect of accuracy increasing with age (β = 28.39, p < 0.001), but no 
significant differences in performance with age in the emotional conditions 
relative to neutral (see Table 1 for full descriptions of the model). 
 
Table 4.1. Best fitting working memory models 
 Variance SD β SE z value p 
0-back       
Random effect       
Intercept 0.59 0.77     
Fixed effect       
Intercept   3.09 0.13 23.46 < 0.001 
Place   -0.25 0.13 -1.88 0.060 
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Happy Face   0.39 0.15 2.53 0.011 
Fear Face   0.09 0.14 0.63 > 0.250 
Age1   9.21 7.67 1.20 0.230 
Place * Age1   -10.47 8.72 -1.20 0.230 
Happy Face * Age1   23.14 8.77 2.64 0.008 
Fear Face * Age1   15.78 8.02 1.97 0.049 
2-back       
Random effect       
Intercept 0.38 0.62     
Fixed effect       
Intercept   2.55 0.11 24.04 < 0.001 
Place   -0.64 0.11 -6.11 < 0.001 
Happy Face   0.19 0.12 1.60 0.111 
Fear Face   -0.61 0.12 -0.52 > 0.250 
Age1   28.39 6.35 4.47 < 0.001 
Place * Age1   -13.66 6.29 -2.17 0.030 
Happy Face * Age1   3.74 6.83 0.55 0.584 
Fear Face * Age1   5.58 7.42 0.75 0.452 
Linear age term is represented by Age1 
 
Recognition memory test 
We tested for age effects in recognition memory for old (stimuli presented in 
the emotional n-back task) and new stimuli in the immediate recall and 24 hour 
recall groups separately, by old or new stimuli and by recall group. 
Recognition memory accuracy for old stimuli was best described by the cubic 
model for the immediate recall group (χ²(4) = 17.71, p = 0.001; Figure 4.4A) 
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and by the simplest model containing only the fixed effect of stimulus type and 
Figure 4.4: Recognition memory for stimuli presented in the emotional n-back. 
A) Immediate recall accuracy for old stimuli shows cubic age-related patterns 
of change. Each colored dot represents a participant and is scaled based on 
number of trials. Lines of best fit shown with 95% confidence interval. B) 24 
hour recall accuracy for old stimuli shows no effect of age, but is enhanced for 
fear faces across age. * = p < 0.05, **= p < 0.01, ***= p < 0.001 
99 
 
no age for the 24 hour recall group (Figure 4.4B). Model fits were not improved 
by the inclusion trial by trial emotional n-back performance (immediate group 
model, χ²(1) = 0.92, p > 0.250; 24 hour group model, χ²(1) = 1.61, p = 0.204) 
or sex (immediate group model, χ²(1) = 0.480, p > 0.250; 24 hour group 
model, χ²(1) = 0.07, p > 0.250) as fixed effects. While model fit was not 
improved by the inclusion of back condition in the 24 hour group model (χ²(1) 
= 0.07, p > 0.250), this parameter significantly improved model fit in the 
immediate group model (χ²(1) = 9.69, p = 0.002) and was therefore retained 
as a covariate. The cubic model for the immediate recall group showed a main 
effect of back condition (β = -0.19, p = 0.002), such that memory for stimuli in 
the 2-back task was worse than memory for stimuli in the 0-back task. The 
immediate recall group also showed significant effects of cubic mean-centered 
age on recognition memory accuracy for places (β = 21.62, p < 0.001) and 
fearful faces (β = 12.85, p = 0.012) relative to neutral faces, such that place 
memory increased into mid-adolescence and subsequently decreased in the 
mid-twenties whereas fearful face memory showed gradual non-linear 
increases with age (see Table 2 for full descriptions of the model). The no age 
model for the 24 hour recall group showed improved recognition memory for 
fearful faces (β = 0.27, p = 0.002) relative to neutral faces (see Table 2 for full 
descriptions of the model). 
 
Table 4.2. Best fitting recognition memory for old stimuli models 
 Variance SD β SE z value p 
Immediate recall       
Random effect       
Intercept 0.21 0.46     
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Fixed effect       
Intercept   0.23 0.09 2.51 0.012 
Place   0.24 0.09 2.80 0.005 
Happy Face   -0.02 0.09 -0.17 > 0.250 
Fear Face   0.06 0.09 0.71 > 0.250 
Age1   5.90 5.02 1.18 0.239 
Age2   -2.16 5.09 -0.43 > 0.250 
Age3   -7.98 5.16 -1.55 0.122 
2-back   -0.19 0.06 -3.11 0.002 
Place * Age1   -2.97 4.92 -0.60 > 0.250 
Happy Face * Age1   3.72 4.84 0.77 > 0.250 
Fear Face * Age1   9.93 4.85 2.05 0.041 
Place * Age2   -12.11 5.14 -2.36 0.019 
Happy Face * Age2   -8.72 4.87 -1.79 0.073 
Fear Face * Age2   -2.86 5.05 -0.57 > 0.250 
Place * Age3   21.62 5.19 4.17 < 0.001 
Happy Face * Age3   1.72 4.92 0.35 > 0.250 
Fear Face * Age3   12.85 5.11 2.52 0.012 
24 hr recall       
Random effect       
Intercept 0.37 0.61     
Fixed effect       
Intercept   -0.07 0.11 -0.64 > 0.250 
Place   -0.02 0.09 -0.27 > 0.250 
Happy Face   0.02 0.09 0.26 > 0.250 
Fear Face   0.27 0.09 3.08 0.002 
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Linear age term is represented by Age1, quadratic term by Age2, and cubic term by Age3 
 
Figure 4.5: Recognition memory test responses to new stimuli. A) Immediate 
accuracy for identifying new stimuli as new is increased for places across 
age. B) 24 hour accuracy for identifying new stimuli as new is increased for 
places across age. ***= p < 0.001 
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Recognition memory accuracy for new stimuli was best described by the 
simplest models containing only the fixed effect of stimulus type and no age 
for both the immediate (Figure 4.5A) and the 24 hr (Figure 4.5B) recall groups. 
Model fits were not improved by the inclusion of sex as a fixed effect 
(immediate group model, χ²(1) = 0.10, p > 0.250; 24 hour group model, χ²(1) = 
0.22, p > 0.250). The model for the immediate recall group showed better 
accuracy at correctly identifying a new stimulus as new for places relative to 
neutral faces in both the immediate (β = 0.12, p < 0.001) and 24 hour (β = 
0.14, p < 0.001) recall groups (see Table 3 for full descriptions of the models). 
 
Table 4.3. Best fitting recognition memory for new stimuli models 
 Variance SD β SE z value p 
Immediate recall       
Random effect       
Intercept 0.59 0.77     
Fixed effect       
Intercept   1.39 0.13 10.54 < 0.001 
Place   0.78 0.12 6.79 < 0.001 
Happy Face   -0.42 0.10 -0.41 > 0.250 
Fear Face   0.14 0.10 1.37 0.171 
24 hr recall       
Random effect       
Intercept 0.67 0.82     
Fixed effect       
Intercept   1.71 0.14 11.85 < 0.001 
Place   0.45 0.12 3.74 < 0.001 
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Happy Face   0.01 0.11 0.11 > 0.250 
Fear Face   -0.69 0.11 -0.62 > 0.250 
 
Discussion 
 
The preliminary findings of this study suggest that distinct patterns of age-
related differences in memory for emotional and non-emotional stimuli emerge 
when memory is assessed in the moment (working memory), immediately 
after encoding (short term memory), and after consolidation (long term 
memory). Working memory accuracy increased linearly across development, 
with more substantial gains in accuracy for emotional stimuli under low 
memory load and better accuracy across age for faces than places under 
higher load. Subsequent memory assessed immediately after encoding 
showed a cubic relationship with age, such that memory for places peaked in 
adolescence whereas memory for fearful faces showed pronounced gains 
from childhood to mid-adolescence and steady improvement into adulthood. 
Finally, recognition memory assessed after 24 hours showed no effect of age, 
but did show better memory for fearful faces across age, consistent with 
previous work showing enhanced memory for negative emotional stimuli in 
both adults and adolescents (Hamann, 2001; Nelson et al., 2003; LaBar & 
Cabeza, 2006; McGaugh, 2004; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Phelps, 2006; 
Vasa et al., 2011; Keightley et al., 2011; Pinabiaux et al., 2013).    
 
Although age-related differences in working memory were not the primary 
focus of the present study, age-related effects on working memory were 
observed in the emotional n-back task. The ability to hold information in mind 
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and to use this information in goal directed responses is believed to be 
functional by middle childhood (Bunge & Wright, 2007). Consistent with 
findings that children are able to retain information in mind, comparable 
performance across age in response to neutral faces and places in 0-back 
condition in the present study. However, modest yet significant linear gains in 
performance were observed from childhood to adulthood in response to both 
happy and fearful faces in this low memory load condition. This what (pattern? 
Observation?suggests that emotional information may impact the ability to 
hold information in mind in children and teens relative to adults. In the higher 
working memory load 2-back condition, linear increases in performance with 
age were observed across cue types, consistent with normative data on n-
back task performance showing age related increases in performance for 1-, 
2-, and 3-back working memory loads (Pelegrina et al., 2015). Despite similar 
linear patterns across cue types, performance was diminished for places 
across age. Still, these findings of age-related differences in two different 
memory loads generally point to linear increases in performance across age. 
 
A cubic relationship between age and recognition memory emerged when 
memory was tested immediately after encoding. Memory for both neutral and 
happy faces showed similar age-related patterns, with gradual increases in 
memory accuracy into the early twenties. In contrast, recognition memory for 
places showed steep improvement into mid-adolescence, followed by declines 
in the mid-twenties. The enhancement of memory for places throughout 
adolescence that later diminishes in adulthood may have several possible 
explanations. It is possible that the increased number of faces—all of which 
are social cues, which may be particularly salient to adolescents (Chein et al., 
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2010; Steinberg et al., 2009; Somerville et al 2011; Jones et al., 2014)— in 
this task relative to places creates interference, which results in adolescents 
showing better memory for unique places. Alternatively, there is evidence to 
suggest that face specialization and improvements in face recognition 
increase with age, as responses to non-face stimuli diminish (Gomez et al., 
2017; Zhu et al., 2016). These studies show differential structural (Gomez et 
al., 2017) and functional (Zhu et al., 2016) development of brain areas 
associated with face processing and social cognition, including the fusiform 
gyrus, superior temporal sulcus, and inferior orbital cortex. Previous studies 
have shown that different areas of functionally defined face (fusiform face 
area, superior temporal sulcus) and place (parahippocampal place area) 
selective cortex show different patterns of structural volume in children, teens, 
and adults (Golarai et al., 2007) and that face selective regions continue to 
develop into adolescence (Grill-Spector et al., 2008). Thus, the boost in place 
memory observed during adolescence may be attributable to imbalances in 
the maturation of place and face selective areas of cortex and their 
interactions with neural circuitry implicated in memory processes across 
development. 
 
Relative to neutral faces, immediate recognition memory for fearful faces 
initially improved more rapidly with age, into the mid to late teens, and then 
showed gradual improvement from late adolescence to adulthood. This result 
suggests that subsequent memory for fearful faces, or cues that indicate a 
potential threat in the environment, shows an accelerated trajectory of 
improvement in recall relative neutral or positive faces. While fearful faces still 
appeared to be prioritized in memory after 24 hours, there were no observed 
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age effects in recognition memory. Across ages, we found that memory for 
fearful faces was enhanced relative to neutral faces after 24 hours and that 
there were no significant differences in memory for happy faces or places 
relative to neutral faces. This temporal dissociation in age-related patterns of 
memory for fearful stimuli may suggest that a period of consolidation allows for 
memory of these salient cues to become comparable to that of adults. 
Previous work has shown that a period of sleep allows children to convert 
implicit knowledge into explicit knowledge and to show even better explicit 
recall of learned sequences relative to adults (Wilhelm et al., 2013). Thus, 
allowing for consolidation may serve to ameliorate age-related differences in 
recognition memory. 
 
No age-related effects were observed in responses to new stimuli presented 
during the recognition memory test in either the immediate recall or 24 hour 
recall group. Both groups of participants showed a similar pattern of 
performance whereby, across ages, participants were more accurate in 
identifying new places as new relative to neutral faces. There were no 
differences in accuracy for emotional facial expressions relative to neutral 
faces. While the comparable, relatively lower levels of accuracy for identifying 
new faces as new may suggest a general familiarity bias for faces, a tendency 
to rate new faces as old, relative to places, this potential bias is similar across 
face type and no age-related differences were observed. Thus, the lack of face 
type or age effects indicates that the age-related differences observed in the 
immediate recall condition and enhanced memory for fearful faces in the 24 
hour recall condition were not driven by a generally increased propensity for 
participants to rate stimuli as previously seen (old).  
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Taken together, these results suggest differing age-related patterns of 
working, short term, and long term memory for emotional and non-emotional 
stimuli may point to a shift in the temporal dynamics of memory processes. A 
shift in age-related patterns of memory processes over time may be due to the 
asymmetric developmental trajectories of face and place selective cortices 
(Golarai et al., 2007; Grill-Spector et al., 2008; Gomez et al., 2017) as well as 
connectivity with neural systems that support emotional episodic memory 
processes, such as the hippocampus, amygdala, and prefrontal cortex 
(Gogtay et al., 2004; Simmonds et al., 2014; Mills et al., 2014; Yonelinas & 
Ritchey, 2015; Daugherty et al., 2016). These findings may have implications 
for better understanding the unique patterns of behaviors often observed 
throughout adolescence (Steinberg, 2005; Ernst et al 2006; Casey et al., 
2008; Blakemore & Robbins, 2012; Casey, 2015), as the relationship between 
age and memory process changes both as function of cue type and time 
elapsed since encountering the cue. The present study also finds that memory 
for fearful faces—cues the are indicative of a potential threat in the 
environment—shows relatively accelerated improvement in the short term with 
age. Memory for cues of potential threat is enhanced after memory 
consolidation across all age, suggesting a potential prioritization in memory of 
cues that may signal threat and may be relevant for the survival of the 
organism. 
 
The reported findings must be considered in light of limitations. With a total of 
97 subjects across two experimental groups, the present study has a small 
sample size to asses developmental effects. Replication of these findings is 
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warranted and data collection of a second sample is under way. The small 
sample size in the present study is primarily due to participants excluded for 
poor task performance, which seemed largely attributable to confusion about 
which task (0-back or 2-back) the participant was playing in any given block. 
We have modified the task presently being run to include a 500 ms colored 
fixation that precedes each task type slide, to draw the participant’s attention 
to the task prompt. The increased number of faces relative to places also 
makes it difficult to ascertain whether observed differences in memory and 
responses to place stimuli may be due to the relative infrequency of these 
stimuli in the tasks versus being attributable to non-emotional and non-social 
stimuli per se. Additional studies with equal amounts of different stimulus types 
would clarify these effects. Finally, although we used neutral faces as the 
baseline to control for social information inherent in faces, it is possible that 
different patterns of results may be observed for emotional non-face stimuli, 
due to the confound of older participants having more experience with faces. 
Further similarly structured studies that include emotional scenes or neutral 
cues paired with positive or negative outcomes will be important for delineating 
developmental trajectories of emotional memory for various types of inputs 
from the environment. 
 
The present study implemented a novel emotional working memory task in 
conjunction with immediate and 24 hour recognition memory tests in order to 
examine developmental trajectories of memory processes for emotional 
information. We show that memory for emotional stimuli, particularly fearful 
faces, differs across development based on the timescale at which memory is 
assessed. As shown previously, working memory shows improvements with 
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age. In contrast patterns of recognition memory begin to differentiate, with 
greater improvement in memory for fearful faces into adolescence, that 
stabilizes and increases gradually into adulthood and increased memory for 
places during adolescence. After a 24 hour consolidation period, 
enhancements in memory for fearful faces are observed across age. These 
data suggest that the temporal dynamics of memory processes may shift 
across development, such that memory gradually becomes more “adult-like” 
as time is allowed for memory representations to be consolidated. Further 
investigation of differences in emotional memory and the underlying neural 
circuitry across development may yield greater insights into how age-related 
changes in memory processes may drive emotional reactivity—and vice 
versa— throughout adolescence.   
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Chapter 5:  
Conclusions and Implications: The complex influences of emotions on 
cognitive and neural processes across development 
 
The preceding chapters aimed to examine the influence of emotions— of both 
positive and negative valence as well as brief and prolonged duration— on 
cognitive and neural processes across development. Using a novel behavioral 
paradigm in conjunction with neuroimaging, the first experiment demonstrated 
dissociable effects of positive and negative brief and prolonged emotional 
states on cognitive control that were paralleled by differential recruitment of 
fronto-parietal and fronto-striatal circuitry in healthy adults (Chapter 2). The 
second experiment used the same experimental paradigm to reveal a 
developmental shift in cognitive control in both brief and prolonged negative 
emotional situations into the early twenties, that coincides with dynamic 
changes in prefrontal circuitry (Chapter 3). Motivated by the question of how 
emotional information may impact memory processes during development, the 
third experiment used a second novel behavioral paradigm to show evidence 
for developmental changes in the temporal dynamics of working, short term, 
and long term memory for emotional and non-emotional stimuli (Chapter 4). 
Together, the experiments described in the previous chapters highlight the 
importance of considering the influences of emotional context on behavior and 
brain function across development and suggest that the understanding of 
emotional influences on cognitive control processes may be bolstered by the 
study of developmental differences in emotional memory processes.  
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Effects of emotion on performance and neural activity vary with age, into 
young adulthood 
 
Consistent with a large body of behavioral, psychophysiological, and 
neuroimaging research referenced in the preceding chapters, the experiments 
in this thesis show that emotional inputs influence cognitive control 
performance and putative neural circuitry differently across age. The current 
thesis builds upon and extends extant findings in several key ways. The CCUE 
task implemented in Chapters 2 and 3 introduces a new behavioral paradigm 
that employs sustained emotional manipulations that are more reliant on 
experimenter control than subject control. The incorporation of both positive 
and negative emotions in the CCUE paradigm allows for distinguishing effects 
of arousal versus valence on both behavior and brain activity. The 
experimental manipulation of sustained, valenced arousal has been validated 
through self-report measures of anticipation of positive or negative outcomes 
and a psychophysiological measure of arousal, although additional data will be 
needed to validate induced states of emotional arousal as mood states (e.g. 
Jallais & Gilet, 2010; Kohn et al., 2013; Wagner et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 
2014). The mixed block/event-related design allows for assessment of 
behavior and brain activity in response to sustained states, brief cues, and 
their interactions. Stimuli and/or anticipated events within the task may be 
modified to address specific experimental questions, such as those pertinent 
to special populations (Dreyfuss et al., under revision).  
 
The fundamental developmental question assessed using the CCUE task was 
whether brief or sustained emotional states impact cognitive control and the 
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underlying neural circuitry differently in the socially and legally relevant age 
range of 18 to 21 years-old relative to teens or adults over 21. Adolescents 
show poorer performance relative to adults under emotional arousal, in line 
with previous research (Galvan et al., 2006; Hare et al., 2008; Geier et al., 
2010; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010; Somerville et al., 2011; Cohen-Gilbert & 
Thomas, 2013; Grose-Fifer et al., 2013; Dreyfuss et al., 2014). Similarly to 
adolescents, young adults show poorer cognitive control relative to adults 
under negative emotion, both brief and prolonged. Decrements in cognitive 
control performance were particularly pronounced in response to fearful cues, 
which signal a potential threat in the environment, with comparable 
performance in teens and young adults. Diminished performance under brief 
and prolonged negative emotions in teens and young adults relative to adults 
was paralleled by differential activity and connectivity of lateral and medial 
prefrontal cortical systems. Examining age continuously revealed a great deal 
of individual variability in behavioral and neural responses, indicating that 
gradual changes occur with development and that there is no obvious 
demarcation point at which behavior or brain activity could be said to be 
“mature.” On the group level, the results of this experiment suggest a 
developmental shift in cognitive control under negative emotions that may be a 
potential behavioral and functional implication of well-documented protracted 
cortical circuitry development (Gogtay et al., 2004; Mills et al., 2014; 2016; 
Simmonds et al., 2014; Sowell et al., 1999; Whitaker et al., 2016). 
 
Few empirical studies have homed in on the behavioral and neural 
development of the late adolescent/young adult age range. Studies of 
adolescent development typically bin by age groups, often placing individuals 
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18 and over in the “adult” category (Somerville, 2016), consistent with legal 
and societal norms. The handful of studies that have investigated social and/or 
emotional influences on cognitive control in young adults used varying age 
ranges to define this age group and the results are mixed (Chein et al., 2011; 
Cohen-Gilbert et al., 2014; Silva et al., 2016; Veroude et al., 2013;  Weigard et 
al., 2014). For example, in separate studies, individuals ages 18 to 22 years 
old showed little impact of peer presence on decision-making in a simulated 
driving task (Chein et al., 2011), less delay discounting (preference for 
immediate smaller rewards over delayed larger rewards) when they believed a 
peer was observing them (Weigard et al., 2014), and better overall gambling 
task performance in the presence of peers (Silva et al., 2016). Behavioral 
differences were not observed in a neuroimaging study of an emotional Stroop 
task comparing 18 - 19 year-olds to 23 - 25 year-olds, however differential 
activation of prefrontal cortical circuitry between the two age groups was 
observed (Veroude et al., 2013), consistent with the findings of the present 
thesis. In line with the idea that developmental shifts in behavior occur into the 
twenties, a recently reported international behavioral study of 5000 individuals 
ages 10 to 30 showed that sensation seeking peaks at age 19 and self-
regulation does not plateau until the mid-twenties (Steinberg et al., 2017). 
Thus, the common takeaway from the extant research, including Chapter 3, is 
that behavioral and functional brain development continue past 18, the age at 
which society typically considers individuals to be adults. 
 
Further evidence of the influences of emotion on behavior and brain activity 
into young adulthood comes from a recent study that also employed the CCUE 
task. The elements of the task were stripped away and analyses focused on 
114 
 
“brain states” in the sustained emotional contexts using residual patterns of 
functional connectivity, similar to resting state, in individuals ages 10 to 25 
years old. “Brain age” of a participant was predicted using functional 
connectivity from the neutral condition and validated using structural MRI data. 
Predicted “brain age” could then be compared to “brain age” in the positive or 
negative emotional states to assess whether individuals were predicted 
younger or older in each emotional state. Teens, on average, showed a 
younger predicted “brain age” under both positive and negative emotional 
states. Next, the hypothesis that predicted younger or older “brain age” may 
represent distinct neural phenotypes that might relate to risky behaviors was 
tested using a self-reported risk perception measure. Across all ages, the 
“predicted younger” phenotype related to increased risk preference and 
decreased risk perception. Grouping individuals by legally relevant age groups 
(13-17, 18-21, and 22-25) as well as those predicted younger or older in each 
emotional state revealed that young adults with predicted younger “brain age” 
in emotional states, both positive and negative, show greater risk preference. 
There were no significant differences in risk preference in either emotional 
state for adolescents or adults based on predicted “brain age.” This 
experiment shows that while teens are more likely to show a predicted 
younger “brain age” under emotional states, young adults predicted younger 
are more likely to consider the benefits of risks over the costs and may take 
more risks (Rudolph et al., 2017). 
 
Together, existing empirical studies of late adolescents/young adults show 
evidence of differences in behavior, brain activity, and functional connectivity 
in response to social and emotional inputs that differs from that of adults. 
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Critically, different patterns of behavior and brain activity only seem to emerge 
in certain social or emotional contexts and there is considerable individual 
variability in both behavior and brain activity. These results suggest that the 
young adult age range may represent a developmental window during which 
individuals may still be particularly sensitive to socioemotional inputs from the 
environment. Future studies that model age continuously as well as 
longitudinal studies may help characterize developmental sensitivities during 
young adulthood. Developmental research examining behavior and brain 
activity in specific emotional, motivational, and social contexts in which 
cognitive control may be liable to breakdown will help establish normative 
developmental trajectories of behavior and neural circuitry under different 
environmental circumstances. Concurrent assessment of how individual 
variability in emotional and behavioral traits may contribute to cognitive control 
processes across age may help to identify characteristics of individuals who 
are particularly prone to lapses or increases in cognitive control.  
 
Temporal dynamics of memory for emotional and non-emotional stimuli 
may be changing across development 
 
The preliminary data presented in Chapter 4 suggest that age-related 
differences in memory for emotional and non-emotional items vary based on 
when memory assessed. Working memory improved linearly across 
development, short term memory showed a cubic age-related pattern, and 
long term memory did not vary with age. Working, short term, and long term 
memory processes each varied based on stimulus type. Memory under low 
load was uniform across age for neutral faces and places, but showed 
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increases for happy and fearful faces. Working memory under higher load 
showed linear increases across stimulus type, but better working memory 
across age for faces versus places. Short term memory in an immediate recall 
group showed similar cubic patterns for neutral and happy faces, such that 
memory improved into adulthood. However, memory for places and fearful 
faces showed significantly different patterns, such that short term memory for 
places peaked in adolescence while short term memory for fearful faces 
initially showed rapid improvement into mid-adolescence, followed by gradual 
improvement into adulthood. Finally, long term memory in a 24 hour recall 
group was increased for fearful stimuli across age. These findings suggest that 
both the time of assessment and the type of stimulus influence memory 
processes across development. 
 
The diverging patterns of short term memory observed for place and fearful 
face stimuli may provide developmental insights rooted in evolutionary history. 
Although the enhanced memory for places during adolescence may be a 
consequence of the structure of the behavioral paradigm (see Chapter 4 
Discussion), the observed boost in memory could also be indicative of an 
adolescent specific effect. The latter is supported by the fact that memory 
gains are not observed for individuals in their mid-twenties and we might 
expect a finding that is an artifact of the task to be observable across ages. It 
may be advantageous for individuals to show better short term memory for 
different settings during the transition to adulthood as this is a time of 
exploration when individuals often encounter new environments as they 
transition to independence and eventually moving away from the home (Casey 
et al., 2010; Casey, 2015). Better memory for places in the short term may aid 
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in dynamic exploration and navigation through different settings or 
environments. Supposing that the boost in memory for places is an artifact of 
the task that is specific to adolescents, this result may suggest that 
adolescents show better memory in the short term for novel stimuli. An 
adolescent specific novelty bias could also be related to facilitating exploration 
and comparisons of novel settings that individuals may encounter during this 
transitional period of development. 
 
In contrast to the adolescent specific pattern of improved short term memory 
for places, short term memory for fearful faces shows an adolescent emergent 
pattern with gradual gains in memory into adulthood. The comparatively rapid 
gains in short term memory for cues of potential threat in the environment, 
relative to neutral or happy cues, from childhood to adolescence may reflect 
the importance of remembering these cues during times of increasing 
independence relative to periods of development when a caregiver is present 
and provides protection. Memory for cues of potential threat may be important 
in the short term due to dynamic exploration of new environments that will 
generally not take place in the presence of a caregiver, with adolescents 
typically returning to the safety of home in between bouts of exploration, until a 
new home is established in adulthood. Following consolidation over a 24 hour 
period, fearful faces are enhanced in memory, irrespective of age, suggesting 
that the evolutionary advantage of retaining cues that indicate a potential 
threat in the environment in long term memory may transcend the caregiver’s 
role in providing safety (Gee, 2016) in more immediate situations, potentially 
giving the organism a chance to recognize and perhaps even avoid possibly 
threatening situations across age. 
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Replication of the findings in Chapter 4 is warranted and further experiments in 
examining episodic memory processes across development will be necessary 
to clarify the influence of emotional, social, and novel information on memory 
processes across development. Neuroimaging studies using paradigms such 
as the one described in the previous chapter will help to elucidate the neural 
mechanisms of developmental changes in memory and how imbalances in 
structural development of brain areas implicated in emotional memory (see 
Chapter 4 Introduction and Discussion for review) may lead to differences in 
circuit function that may influence memory for specific cue types at different 
timescales. A related area of study that may yield important developmental 
insights linking changes in emotional memory to changes in behavior is the 
study of emotional learning and memory for emotional learning. The 
experimental paradigm presented in Chapter 4 did not include a learning 
component, which may lead to different patterns of emotional memory than 
those observed in the present study.  
 
Emotional learning and memory have most commonly been studied using fear 
conditioning. Developmental studies of fear conditioning have primarily been 
carried out in rodents (Shechner et al., 2014). A particularly striking 
developmental finding is that of temporary suppression of contextual fear 
memory during adolescence in mice, which can subsequently be retrieved in 
adulthood (Pattwell et al., 2011). Temporary suppression of contextual fear 
memory is thought to be due to changes in hippocampal-amygdala 
communication, resulting in blunted amygdala activity during adolescence, in 
contrast to an imbalance in prefrontal-amygdala circuitry, resulting in 
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heightened amygdala activity, thought to underlie attenuated cued fear 
extinction during adolescence (Casey, 2015; Pattwell et al., 2012). A study in 
mice aimed at reconciling these two divergent findings shows that dynamic 
remodeling amygdala-hippocampal-mPFC circuitry is associated with changes 
in behavior during adolescence and that targeting components of amygdala-
hippocampal-mPFC circuitry via behavioral interventions can lead to changes 
in long-term fear memory expression (Pattwell et al., 2016). Together, these 
studies suggest that developing emotional learning and memory processes 
can differentially affect behaviors, both in the short and long term. Further 
characterization of developmental trajectories of emotional learning, memory, 
and underlying neural circuitry will be informative for determining the interplay 
between learning, memory, and cognitive control across development. 
 
A unique developmental sensitivity to negative emotions 
 
While adolescence is often conceptualized as a time of sensitivity to rewards, 
full of excitement and thrills, the data in the current thesis emphasize that 
negative emotions can also impact cognitive and neural processes throughout 
adolescence. In particular, the present thesis highlights developmental 
differences in response to potential threat. The results of the experiments 
presented in the previous chapters show effects of both brief and prolonged 
potential threat on cognitive control and underlying neural circuitry in 
adolescents and young adults as well as effects of cues of potential threat on 
episodic memory processes across development. The way individuals detect, 
process, remember, and ultimately react to potential threats in the 
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environment might impact survival, thus the findings described in the previous 
sections may have an evolutionary basis.  
 
As described in the previous section, the transition into adulthood is filled with 
new experiences and exploration of new environments. Adolescents have 
been proposed to show attenuated sensitivity to aversive properties of stimuli, 
which may motivate them towards action when faced with negative emotional 
stimuli (Doremus-Fitzwater & Spear, 2017). Attenuated aversions would help 
to facilitate exploration, even when faced with aversive inputs from the 
environment, which is crucial for gaining new experiences and eventually 
establishing independence from the caregiver. While adolescents may be 
more capable of tolerating aversive properties of stimuli, the data in the 
present thesis also suggest increased vigilance and better memory for 
potential threats. Heightened vigilance and memory for cues that indicate 
potential threats would serve to promote survival by enhancing awareness of 
possible dangers that may be present while exploring new environments 
(Casey, 2015). Together, overcoming aversive properties of the environment 
while remaining vigilant and storing cues that may indicate threat in memory 
would help to promote healthy, adaptive development. However, 
developmental sensitivities to negative emotions, which might show 
interindividual variability, may also be related to increased prevalence of 
anxiety and stress related disorders during adolescence (Hartley & Casey, 
2013). The implications of the experiments described in the present thesis will 
be further discussed with respect to mental health, social, and legal policy in 
subsequent sections. 
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Implications for models of adolescent neurobiology 
 
The prominent neurobiological models of adolescence all recognize 
asymmetric and dynamic changes in developmental trajectories of limbic and 
prefrontal circuitries as probable neurobiological mechanisms underlying 
adolescent behaviors (Steinberg, 2005; Ernst et al 2006; Casey et al., 2008), 
which is a premise supported by a multitude of developmental science 
research (e.g. Monk et al., 2003; Galvan et al., 2006; Hare et al., 2008; Geier 
et al., 2010; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010; Somerville et al., 2011; Cohen-
Gilbert & Thomas, 2013; Grose-Fifer et al., 2013; Dreyfuss et al., 2014; Gee et 
al., 2014; Heller et al., 2016). The experiments in the current thesis suggest 
several refinements to the existing models that may be useful additions to the 
conceptualization of adolescent neurobiology and the behavioral implications. 
Chapters 2 and 3 support recent work highlighting the importance of within 
and between network connectivity (Gu et al., 2015), particularly amongst 
cortical networks involving the prefrontal cortex (Crone & Steinbeis, 2017), in 
contributing to the development of cognitive processes. Chapter 4 supports a 
recent proposal (Murty et al., 2016) of the integration of hippocampally-
mediated learning and memory processes into existing conceptual frameworks 
of how social, emotional, and motivational information may influence cognitive 
control throughout adolescence. This section will describe proposed 
refinements in further detail, drawing from both conclusions of experiments in 
the current thesis and recent developmental research.  
 
While much of the focus of adolescent neurobiological models has been on 
the development of subcortical-subcortical and subcortical-cortical connections 
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highlighted by the imbalance model (Casey et al., 2008; Casey, 2015), recent 
elaboration of the imbalance model (Casey et al., 2016) and emerging 
empirical work suggests that imbalances within and between cortical circuitries 
may be a crucial component of changes in cognitive control behaviors into late 
adolescence/young adulthood. Studies of neurocircuitry function in rodents 
show that major functional changes take place within the circuits of the PFC 
during adolescence. Adolescence is a time of major remodeling of both pre- 
and postsynaptic glutamatergic and GABAergic signaling, which is modulated 
in large part by dopamine and cannabinoids (Caballero et al., 2016). D1 
receptor expression does not reach adult levels in the PFC until late 
adolescence (Flores-Barrera et al., 2014; Tseng & O’Donnell, 2007), thus it is 
hypothesized that the transition into adulthood may be a critical phase for 
refinement of dopamine-dependent neurotransmission (Caballero et al., 2016). 
Endocannabinoid receptor and ligand levels also show major changes in PFC 
over the course of development, with most studies pointing towards enhanced 
endocannabinoid signaling during adolescence that can influence 
glutamatergic, GABAergic, and dopaminergic signaling (Doremus-Fitzwater & 
Spear, 2016; Fitzgerald et al., 2012). Developmental changes in 
neurotransmission are thought to underlie changing behavior throughout 
adolescence, although further work linking neurochemical and microcircuit-
level changes to behavior is needed (Doremus-Fitzwater & Spear, 2016). The 
PFC in rodents is often described as a single region or is subdivided into 
prelimbic and infralimbic cortex, limiting the potential extrapolations of these 
data to humans. Nonetheless, these data provide evidence of significant 
functional remodeling of connections within the PFC during adolescence that 
may have important implications for behavior. 
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Several recent studies of functional connectivity in humans across 
adolescence support the idea that ongoing functional organization of cortico-
cortical connections involving the prefrontal cortex may be critical to the 
development of cognitive control processes. Analysis of resting state 
connectivity shows that the largely cortical default mode network begins to 
play a major role in facilitating connections between other neural systems 
during adolescence and that between network connectivity of various neural 
systems with the default mode network is correlated with a general measure of 
cognitive performance across age (Gu et al., 2015). A contemporaneous study 
of diffusion MRI shows significant remodeling of brain network hub 
connectivity—such that connectivity of frontal hubs with both subcortical and 
cortical hubs becoming particularly prominent— in late adolescence (Baker et 
al., 2015). These results are paralleled by the aforementioned study of 
emotional “brain age,” as the key nodes of functional neuroanatomy 
associated with age prediction were mostly cortical regions, including the 
vmPFC, dmPFC, and mPFC regions of the default mode network (Rudolph et 
al., 2017). A study of age-related differences in emotion regulation further 
showed that inverse vmPFC-amygdala coupling is associated with age and 
that vlPFC activity is also associated with the vmPFC-amygdala relationship, 
implicating vlPFC interactions with the vmPFC in better age-related negative 
affect regulation (Silvers et al., 2016). Together, these studies suggest that 
cortical network remodeling involving the PFC may be important for the 
development of cognitive control, especially in emotional contexts. 
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Chapter 3 of the current thesis describes age-related differences in lateral and 
medial prefrontal activity and connectivity that emerge in negative emotional 
contexts. Although lateral and medial prefrontal cortex are each composed of 
subregions, the broad lateral and medial divisions of PFC are implicated in 
different contributions to behavior, neural computations, and neural networks. 
Lateral PFC is implicated in behavioral regulation, including cognitive control 
(Tanji & Hoshi, 2008, Vincent et al., 2008) and affective regulation (Silvers et 
al., 2015; Wager et al., 2008) processes, and as a component of the fronto-
parietal and cingulo-opercular networks (Power et al., 2011). Medial PFC is 
implicated in self-referential thought, integration of affective information, 
affective computations and regulation (Roy et al., 2012), and is a component 
of the default mode network (Power et al., 2011). Medial PFC has reciprocal 
connections with subcortical regions, thus it has been proposed that lateral 
PFC systems regulate cortico-subcortical and subcortico-subcortical systems 
via cortico-cortical connections with the medial prefrontal circuitry (Casey et 
al., 2016; Silvers et al., 2016). A recent review of models of cognitive control in 
childhood and adolescence suggests that models of the developmental 
neurobiology of cognitive control can be further refined by taking into 
consideration the putative computations performed by different subregions of 
PFC, particularly dorsolateral versus medial PFC, and the development of 
connectivity between subregions (Crone & Steinbeis, 2017). While defining 
developmental profiles of each subregion of the PFC is likely beyond the 
scope of a single model—a recent multi-modal parcellation of human adult 
cortex suggests that mPFC and dlPFC alone can be subdivided into 
approximately 28 subregions (Glasser et al., 2016)—incorporating a broad 
framework describing the protracted development of cortico-cortical 
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interactions (Casey et al., 2016) may paint a more complete picture of 
adolescent neurobiology. 
 
A neurocognitive system that has yet to be fully conceptually integrated with 
current neurobiological accounts of adolescence is the hippocampally-based 
memory system and its communication with prefrontal cortical and limbic 
subcortical systems. The imbalance model has suggested that the 
hippocampus plays an important role in adolescent neurobiology by 
highlighting the critical function of hippocampal projections to the amygdala 
and PFC providing contextual information that influences fear memory and 
extinction memory in fear conditioning paradigms across species (Casey, 
2015). The current thesis suggests that episodic memories for emotional and 
non-emotional cues show different age-related patterns when working, short 
term, and long term memory are assessed. While we have proposed that the 
observed changes in memory processes may be due to imbalances in 
development of neural circuitry implicated in emotional and declarative 
memory, further studies examining emotional memory processes in 
conjunction with neuroimaging are necessary to gain a better understanding of 
how neural memory systems may be interacting differently across age.  
 
The hippocampus appears to show regional volumetric changes across 
adolescence (Daugherty et al., 2016; Gogtay et al., 2006; Tamnes et al., 
2014), similar to protracted development cortical regions such as the PFC 
(Gogtay et al., 2004; Simmonds et al., 2014; Mills et al., 2016). The protracted 
structural development of hippocampal and cortical regions suggests that 
functional maturation of circuits involving the hippocampus and PFC may 
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continue into young adulthood. While studies of fear conditioning, primarily in 
rodents, clearly indicate a consequential role for memory systems involving 
hippocampus-amygdala-mPFC circuitry in behaviors expressed both in the 
short and long-term, there has been little empirical work investigating how 
memory systems may interact with cognitive control systems across 
development in humans.  
 
A recently proposed model of cognitive development during adolescence 
posits that interactions between memory and executive systems, supported by 
the hippocampus and PFC and modulated by mesolimbic dopamine, are 
crucial for supporting goal-directed behaviors (Murty et al., 2016). Specifically, 
the integration of previous experiences with the present situation is proposed 
to be particularly important in guiding behavior. Given that heightened 
sensitivity to emotional inputs during adolescence is associated with reactive 
behaviors in the heat of the moment, it seems perhaps more compatible to 
suggest that memory and control processes interact bidirectionally and 
synergistically to facilitate adaptive behaviors across development. That is, 
prior experiences with different stimuli in different contexts may influence 
behavior and behavior in response to different stimuli in different contexts may 
influence memory. Learning would seem to rest at the intersection of cognitive 
control and memory processes, with emotional learning enabling the prediction 
of motivationally salient events and reflexive deployment of physiological and 
behavioral responses that are refined over time. 
 
Together, these minor refinements to concepts already set forth by the 
imbalance model of adolescent neurobiology (Casey, 2015; Casey et al., 
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2016) further integrate cortical networks and active learning and memory 
processes into this circuit and action-based account of cognitive development. 
Evidence of structural and functional development of the neurocircuitry 
implicated in cognitive processes into young adulthood suggests that 
behavioral implications of protracted development, such as the emergent 
findings reported in the current thesis, should be observable. Another nuanced 
inference that arises from further highlighting a role for learning and memory 
systems in the neurobiology of cognitive development is the increased 
emphasis on the ongoing interactions between the biological and experiential 
components of development (Byrge et al., 2014; Karmiloff-Smith, 2009). 
Development is a dynamic process involving cascades of neural and 
behavioral changes (Casey et al., 2016; Masten & Cicchetti, 2010) that can be 
influenced not just in the moment but also in the long-term by environmental 
inputs, particularly by salient social, emotional, and/or motivational inputs. 
Differences in both life experiences and the way that life experiences are 
processed and stored in memory may account, in part, for the heterogeneity 
observed in both behavior and activity of neural systerms across development. 
Thus, models of adolescent neurobiology can be characterized by imbalances 
and integration of neural circuitry, shaped by environmental inputs and 
experiences in novel environments. 
  
Implications for mental health policy 
 
The World Economic Forum has reported that mental illnesses are the largest 
cost drivers of non-communicable diseases at an estimated $2.5 trillion in 
global costs in 2010 and projected cost of $6 trillion by 2030 (WHO, 2007). 
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Roughly half of all Americans are predicted to meet criteria for a mental health 
disorder at some point in their lives (Kessler et al., 2005). Approximately 75% 
of the first onsets of mental illness occur by the mid-20s, with 25% of the first 
onsets occurring in the late teens to mid-twenties (Kessler et al., 2007). 
Moreover, psychiatric illness is the strongest risk factor for suicide (Moscicki, 
2001), which is the third leading cause of death in young people ages 15 to 24 
(CDC, 2010). These epidemiological data highlight the importance of 
understanding basic behavioral and neural developmental trajectories through 
young adulthood as a step towards identifying routes for potential early 
interventions that will improve outcomes and ultimately reduce the economic 
burden placed on society.  
 
Emotional dysregulation—both cue triggered and on sustained timescales— is 
a core feature of most mental illnesses (Hofmann et al., 2012; Gross & 
Jazaieri, 2014). Adolescents’ increased emotional reactivity and poorer 
cognitive control in emotional contexts may contribute to the increased 
prevalence of mental illness during this transitional period of development 
(Merikangas et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2014). The findings presented in the 
current thesis suggest developmental sensitivities to negative emotional 
information, into young adulthood. Chapter 3 provides evidence that young 
adults’ behavioral performance and brain activity is influenced by negative 
emotions, both brief and prolonged, similarly to adolescents. Negative 
emotions and their impact on cognitive control behaviors are relevant to core 
features of internalizing (anxiety and mood disorders) and externalizing 
disorders (such as conduct and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorders) that 
are prevalent in young people (Merikangas et al., 2010). Furthermore, 
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impulsivity in the context of negative emotions is higher in individuals with 
suicidal ideations and in those who attempt suicide (Klonsky & May, 2010). 
Thus, the behaviors occurring in negative affective states may be maladaptive 
and even, as underscored by the extreme case of attempted suicide, highly 
detrimental to the individual. Further studies of the development of behavioral 
regulation in various emotional, social, and motivational contexts and the 
neural correlates into young adulthood may provide important insights into 
disorders that commonly emerge in adolescence or young adulthood, such as 
substance abuse and mood disorders (Kessler et al., 2005; 2007). 
 
Developmental changes in emotional learning and memory processes may 
also contribute to increased vulnerability to mental illnesses during the 
transition to adulthood. Chapter 4 provides evidence for accelerated 
improvements in short term memory for negative emotional cues with age and 
enhanced long term memory for negative emotional cues across age. The 
prioritization of negative emotional items in memory may serve as a catalyst 
for dysregulation of negative emotions. While perturbations in emotional 
learning and memory processes exist in a number of different mental disorders 
(Harvey et al., 2014; Morris et al., 2014), perhaps the most well studied 
paradigm is fear conditioning, which serves as an experimental model of the 
cognitive processes that elicit the reflexive physiological and behavioral 
responses characteristic of anxiety disorders (LeDoux & Pine, 2016). As 
described in previous sections, there are marked changes in fear learning and 
memory that emerge during adolescence. Vulnerability to anxiety or stress-
related disorders may be conferred by individual differences in the 
neurocognitive structure of fear conditioning. Some individuals may update a 
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learned fear memory with safety information during fear extinction, whereas 
other individuals may form a new memory during extinction, leaving the 
original fear memory intact, leading to increased spontaneous recovery of the 
fear response (Gershman & Hartley, 2015). While the neural mechanisms and 
developmental trajectories of such individual differences have yet to be 
studied, the delineation of individual variability in emotional learning and 
memory processes may offer important insights into neurocognitive factors 
that influence risk and resilience to psychiatric disorders.  
 
Ongoing behavioral and brain development throughout adolescence into 
young adulthood presents an opportunity to better understand the etiology of 
mental illnesses and possible avenues for early intervention and treatment as 
steps toward reducing the burden of mental illness on individuals and society 
(Lee et al., 2014). Aligning with the focus on emotional influences on cognitive 
processes in the present thesis, researchers and clinicians have suggested 
that tailoring psychotherapeutic interventions to concentrate on building 
emotional regulation (Moyal et al., 2015) and learning and memory (Harvey et 
al., 2014) strategies may improve the effectiveness of these treatments. 
Developmental neuroscience research may shed light on key timepoints and 
specific contexts over the course of development when interventions or 
treatments may be the most, or the least, efficacious (Suleiman & Dahl, 2017) 
and may delineate developmental trajectories of individual differences that 
have implications for identifying individuals who may be most vulnerable to 
progression to a clinical disorder. Acquiring a more comprehensive 
understanding of the normative development of neurocognitive processes is a 
crucial step towards uncovering potential neurobiological and behavioral 
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markers of pathological dysregulation, particularly in response to emotions or 
in emotional states, that may be important for early identification of psychiatric 
disorder and in assessing outcomes of interventions across development.   
 
Implications for social and legal policy 
 
Age-related social and legal policies, from age of jurisdiction to legal ages of 
purchasing controlled substances to eligibility for social and financial support, 
have historically been based on political considerations and conventional 
wisdom rather than empirical evidence. The past twelve years have brought 
about several landmark US Supreme Court decisions citing developmental 
science to make the case for differential treatment of juvenile and adult 
offenders in the criminal justice system (Cohen & Casey, 2014) signaling a 
potential shift towards evidence-based policymaking, at least with respect to 
the treatment of young people. Much of the existing work informing juvenile 
justice policy has relied on psychological rather than neuroscientific evidence, 
with psychologists and legal scholars collaborating to describe potential 
juvenile justice policy implications of developmental differences in behavior 
(e.g., risk taking, sensation seeking, impulsivity). While neuroimaging 
techniques are not presently capable of supporting arguments for or against 
the guilt or innocence of defendants, developmental neuroscience research 
allows for suggestions of potential neural mechanisms that may explain the 
unique behavioral patterns observed across development and therefore 
complements psychological research by providing converging evidence for 
developmental phenomena. 
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While a substantial body of work has focused on the adolescent age range, 
most often defined as ages 13 to 17, less research has focused on the late 
adolescent/young adult age range. The young adult age range is of particular 
legal and social relevance as it is the timeframe in which, for different intents 
and purposes, an individual begins to be considered an adult in our society 
(Cohen et al., 2016). The current thesis provides evidence that, similar to 
teens, young adults age 18 to 21 show diminished cognitive control relative to 
slightly older adults in threatening situations that is paralleled by differential 
activation of lateral and medial prefrontal circuitry. This pattern of diminished 
performance was not observed in a neutral condition and young adults actually 
shows more similar behavior and brain activation to adults than to teens when 
presented with positive social cues (smiling faces). These data highlight the 
importance of considering influences of emotional context on brain and 
behavior when evaluating age-related legal and social policies. 
 
Justice centers and programs have already begun to recognize young adults 
as a unique transitional age group, typically defined as ages 18 to 24, in large 
part due to developmental neuroscience evidence showing continued brain 
maturation well into the 20s (Institute of Medicine & National Research 
Council, 2014). However, the treatment of young adults in the system is often 
unpredictable. While individuals 18 and older, and oftentimes individuals even 
younger, are typically referred to the adult justice system, young adults can 
technically be under the jurisdiction of both the juvenile and adult justice 
systems for the purposes of supervision and services. The lack of defined 
roles for either system can lead to lapses in necessary services, such as 
health care, education, and general welfare, for young adults (The Council of 
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State Governments Justice Center, 2015). Another complexity in the treatment 
of young adults in the system is that this age range shows significantly higher 
rates of recidivism compared to other age groups, with one study finding that 
84% of individuals released under the age of 25 were rearrested within five 
years (Durose et al., 2014). Due in part to the fact that research on young 
adults has thus far been limited, policymakers have yet to reach a clear 
consensus on how to best serve this age group in order to reduce recidivism 
and improve outcomes (Institute of Medicine & National Research Council, 
2014; The Council of State Governments Justice Center, 2015). 
 
The influence of emotions on brain and behavior into young adulthood is also 
of particular relevance to the criminal justice system given the prevalence of 
mental illness amongst those in the system, especially amongst youth. 
Approximately 70% of incarcerated juveniles and 50% of incarcerated adults 
have a diagnosable mental illness (James & Glaze, 2006; Meservey & 
Skowyra, 2015). Many of these individuals, especially the young adults, have 
a co-occurring substance use disorder. Amongst juveniles, nearly 30% of 
disorders lead to serious impairments in functioning (Shufelt & Cocozza, 
2006). Mental health considerations are further complicated by traumas 
experienced, predominantly by younger inmates, during previous 
incarcerations for which individuals typically do not receive treatment (The 
Council of State Governments Justice Center, 2015). Results from Chapter 4 
of the current thesis together with previous work both in humans and rodents 
suggests enhanced, persistent memory for negative emotional events, which 
may be exacerbated if individuals remain in the prison system environment. 
This unfortunate reality further underscores the importance of understanding 
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neurocognitive processes in negative emotional states, which are frequently 
encountered when incarcerated, across development. Research focusing on 
the influences of negative emotions on behavior and brain activity across 
development can serve as a step towards further highlighting to policymakers 
the potentially detrimental effects of negative emotional experiences on the 
developing brain and aiding in identifying ways to mitigate the harmful 
consequences for young people in the system.  
 
The justice system’s recognition of juveniles and young adults as 
developmental populations that fundamentally differ from adults offers the 
implicit recognition that the brain does not mature in isolation but rather is fine-
tuned with experiences and learning. Learning occurs both by doing and by 
observing. Opportunities to engage in active learning and to master the skills 
necessary to successfully transition into independent adulthood are 
dramatically reduced and influenced by experiences of incarceration. This is 
not to suggest that teens and young adults should not be held accountable for 
their actions, but rather that diminished responsibility in specific contexts 
during this transitional period of development may be considered in 
sentencing, punishment, and rehabilitation. Further justice system reforms 
related to the treatment of juveniles and young adults should create more 
opportunities to engage in prosocial interactions in the community and to have 
prosocial role models in order to alleviate the potentially harmful effects of 
negative emotional experiences inherent to the criminal justice system. This 
approach to future reforms may be useful for bolstering healthy development 
and may help improve long-term outcomes as young people leave the system 
and become members of society. As developmental science continues to shed 
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light on how different experiences, situations, and environmental inputs impact 
brain and behavior, the results of developmental research may be pertinent to 
future court rulings and policy decisions regarding the treatment of juveniles 
and young adults in the criminal justice system.  
 
Future directions 
 
The ability to learn from and remember salient information in the environment 
is essential for an individual to survive and thrive throughout the lifespan. A 
burgeoning idea in the current thesis is that emotional information in the 
environment may influence the capacity to learn and remember across 
development. Developmental differences in emotional learning and memory 
may in turn show a synergistic relationship with behaviors in response to 
emotional information. Studies of classical conditioning have shown that, as 
individuals track the dynamic state of the world around them, the emotional 
significance of a cue, and therefore the behavioral responses to the cue, can 
fluctuate as the statistics of the environment change (Phelps & LeDoux, 2005; 
Milad & Quirk, 2012; Dunsmoor et al., 2015). Studies of fear learning reviewed 
earlier in this chapter suggest that normative developmental changes in 
neurocognitive processes may cause emotional learning and memory to 
become more persistent, exerting greater influence over subsequent behavior, 
or to become suppressed, exerting little immediate influence on behavior, 
during adolescence. Although there exists a rich literature on how emotional 
information, can drive immediate responses and actions across development 
(e.g. Hare et al., 2008; Geier et al., 2010; Somerville et al., 2011; Cohen-
Gilbert & Thomas, 2013; Grose-Fifer et al., 2013; Dreyfuss et al., 2014; Heller 
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et al., 2016), few studies have considered developmental changes in the 
neurocognitive structure of emotional learning, how developmental differences 
may influence the persistence of emotional information in memory, or how 
individual variability in emotional learning may alter developmental trajectories 
of memory processes. 
 
Recent work highlights qualitative differences in the cognitive representations 
that can be formed during dynamic emotional learning, specifically during fear 
conditioning (Gershman et al., 2010; Gershman & Hartley, 2015). Whereas for 
some, memories of fear learning may be eroded by neutral experience, for 
others, learned fear may persist in memory, remaining capable of influencing 
subsequent behavior. Such differences can be captured using computational 
models of classical conditioning, informed by behavioral neuroscience 
research in both animals and humans (Gershman et al., 2010; Gershman & 
Hartley, 2015; Dunsmoor et al., 2015). Although recent studies suggest 
pronounced changes in both positive and negative emotional learning and 
memory processes across development (Baker & Richardson, 2015; Davidow 
et al., 2016), little is known about how variation in emotional learning emerges 
developmentally, at both the behavioral and neurobiological levels, and how 
these changes in the cognitive structure of affective associations may 
modulate subsequent memory of episodic details in the environment.  
 
Experiments addressing these research questions lie at the intersection of 
developmental, affective, and computational cognitive neuroscience. An 
integrated program of research would begin to address how emotions 
influence learning, memory, and underlying neural processes by investigating: 
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1) developmental trajectories of individual variability in the neurocognitive 
structure of emotional learning, both positive and negative, 2) the potential 
utility of computational models that capture variation in learning processes in 
forming predictions about engagement of neural circuitry underlying emotional 
learning across development, and 3) how individual differences in emotional 
learning may influence memory for items presented during learning. This 
program of research will begin to elucidate how heterogenous developmental 
changes in the lability or persistence of emotional learning in memory may 
render previous emotional experiences capable of shaping subsequent 
behavior. Studying individual variation in emotional learning and memory 
across development may provide insights into characteristics that make 
someone vulnerable to mental illness. By leveraging computational modeling, 
neuroimaging, psychophysiological, and behavioral approaches to better 
understand developmental changes in how individuals learn and remember 
the structure of the emotional environment, these future research directions 
build upon themes of the current thesis and may shed light on the 
neurocognitive processes underlying emotional learning and memory that may 
promote the healthy development of motivated behavior. 
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APPENDECIES 
Appendix 1. Supplemental Results, Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplemental Fig. S1. Behavioral performance as indexed by d-prime in the a) 
neutral state and b) excite state. 
 
Behavioral Results  
 
We tested the complete, repeated measures model (including all states and 
cues) and while there was a main effect of age group (F(2,98) = 15.09, p < .001, 
ηp 2 = .23) and an emotional state by emotional cue interaction (F(4,392) = 4.37, 
p = .004, ηp 2 = .04), there was no significant interaction of state and cue with 
age group (F(8,392) = 1.39, p = .199). 
 
To test whether race, IQ or socioeconomic status could account for the 
reported findings, we also ran age group analyses controlling for race, 
performance IQ, and maternal education. One-hundred and five of the 110 
subjects had performance IQ and maternal education information available. 
The main effects of age group remain significant for performance to fear cues 
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(F(2,80) = 9.49, p < .001, ηp 2 = .11), happy cues (F(2,80) = 8.42, p < .001, ηp 2 = 
.13), calm cues in neutral (F(2,80) = 6.81, p = .001, ηp 2 = .11), threat (F(2,80) = 
16.60, p < .001, ηp 2 = .28), and excitement (F(2,80) = 7.99, p < .001, ηp 2 = .16). 
 
Imaging Results  
 
Happy Cues. In parallel to the behavioral results in this emotional condition, 
we constructed a general linear test in the group linear mixed-effects 
emotional cue model to compare brain activity of teens to that of adults and 
young adults, relative to implicit baseline, in response to the happy cues. We 
found a single cluster that survived whole brain correction, showing more 
activity in teens than both young adults and adults: the right inferior frontal 
gyrus (x = -32.5, y = -24.5, z = -11.5, Z = -4.18, cluster: 30 voxels, p < .02, 
corrected, Figure S3b and S3c). This is consistent with prior work showing 
Supplemental Fig. S2. (a) Behavioral performance as indexed by d-prime 
to (b) happy cues. Diminished behavioral performance in teens was 
paralleled by increased activity in (b,c) right inferior frontal gyrus (RIFG). 
Means ± s.e. presented. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 ***= p < .001 
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greater RIFG activity for correct trials corresponding with poorer performance 
across age (Somerville et al., 2010). MR signal changes in this region showed 
a negative correlation with behavioral performance to happy faces (r(108) = -
0.222, p = 0.020), which did not remain statistically significant when controlling 
for age (r(108) = -0.121, p = 0.209), suggesting that this association was 
driven by differences in activation across ages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conjunction Analysis. A conjunction analyses was performed to examine the 
degree of overlap of the parietal regions identified in the emotional cue by 
continuous age and emotional state by continuous age analyses. Activation 
maps at an individual voxel threshold of p = 0.005 were used for the analysis 
(Figure S4). 
Supplemental Fig. S4. Parietal activations in the emotional cue by 
continuous age analysis (green), the emotional state by continuous 
age analysis (orange), and the overlap (red). 
Supplemental Fig. S3. (a) Parietal activation identified in the emotional 
state by continuous age analysis. (b) Sustained BOLD activity in the 
parietal cortex under threat and excitement was positively correlated 
with behavior across age. 
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Appendix 2. Additional Tables, Chapter 3 
This appendix provides additional details about the community sample at each 
site (see Table A1) Both site and sex were covariates in our original design 
because the data reported are from community samples from two sites (Los 
Angeles and New York City), one of which had fewer subjects and 
proportionately more teens and females than the other. Because site 
contributed significantly to the variance and sex is a legally relevant variable 
(males have more encounters with the law and justice system than females 
do), we included both covariates as variables of interest rather than as simple 
regressors, thereby reducing the degrees of freedom in our model. Treating 
either or both of these variables as simple regressors did not affect the pattern 
of statistical significance of our results (ps < .005, p2s  .1).   
 
Tables A2 through A6 provide complete details for the five originally planned 
analyses of variance assessing the effects of emotional cues in the neutral 
state and calm cues in the emotional states on participants’ accuracy (d). In 
addition, Table A7 provides statistical results for a full model testing the effects 
of all variables and their interactions on accuracy. This model includes 
interactions of simultaneous and opposing positive and negative emotions 
(e.g., fearful cues when participants were in a state of excitement), although 
these interactions were not the focus of the study. In this analysis, the pattern 
of results for the effects of potential threat (fearful cues) are similar to those 
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reported for our planned comparisons. Specifically, there is a significant Age 
Group  Cue Type interaction, F(4, 196) = 2.99, p = .02, p2 = .053 across the 
three emotional states (positive, negative, and neutral); cues of potential threat 
affected cognitive-control capacity similarly in teens and young adults relative 
to adults over age 21—teens versus adults: t(63.15) = 4.48, p < .001, d = 1.04; 
young adults versus adults: t(66.79) = 3.66, p < .001, d = 0.88; teens versus 
young adults: t(66.28) = 0.41, p > .250, d = 0.09. The interaction of age group 
and sustained emotional state across all three types of emotional cues 
(positive, negative, and neutral) was not significant for this model, F(4, 196) = 
1.58, p = .18, p2 = .022. The interactive effect of simultaneous and opposing 
positive and negative emotions on cognitive control is peripheral to our 
scientific question and hypotheses, but nonetheless equally interesting.  
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